THE DEVELOPMENT OF LONDON
BY KING ALFRED: A REASSESSMENT

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SUMMARY
A model is presented which characterises the physical, spatial and functional development of London as a new burh of King Alfred in or soon after late AD 879, when he assumed control of the whole of Mercia after Guthrum’s Vikings had retreated to an independent kingdom in East Anglia. The hypothesis of the creation of a burh within the Roman walls at this time, rather than the generally held paradigm that this took place in AD 886, is supported by recent reinterpretations of the coinage of the period, and by a detailed re-examination of the archaeological record. It is argued that it is at this time that the basic pattern of the medieval and later street system was established within the new burghal space, though this probably had earlier antecedents. This process would have included the restoration of London Bridge, which would have functioned as a strategic device against access up the Thames to Viking warships, and which Alfred had arguably inherited from earlier periods. This interpretation also puts into proper historical context the prior development of Southwark (as well as of other sites listed in the contemporary Burghal Hidage document) as a burh, and casts a new light on developments relating to London in the 880s, such as the involvement of ealdorman Æthelred in AD 886, and the creation of the see of the bishop of Worcester in AD 889.

INTRODUCTION
The political and historical context for the development of late Saxon London has been a matter of debate for some time. Recent studies have focused on the development of the burh by King Alfred, which until recently has been generally recognised as a process which was begun in or soon after AD 886 as a new beginning after London had been occupied for some years by Viking forces (Stenton 1971, 258–9; Dyson 1990; Clark 1999; Clark 2000; Keene 2003; Ross & Clark 2008, 56). This view, however, has begun to be modified, both by detailed work on the coinage of the period, and by a reassessment of Alfred’s relationship with Mercia (Blackburn 1998; Keynes 1998). This new work, in which several entrenched paradigms are challenged, has made it possible to formulate a new model for the political and historical development of London and its area in the late 870s and early 880s, which is presented elsewhere (Haslam forthcoming a). This is itself based on a reassessment of the date and context of King Alfred’s burghal system in Wessex as belonging to the period AD 878–9, immediately after Alfred’s victory over Guthrum’s forces at Edington, as well as the date of the Burghal Hidage document which describes this system, with which it is seen as being contemporary (Haslam 2005; Haslam 2009; Haslam forthcoming a). In this reassessment it is argued that a new burh was created at London by King Alfred in late AD 879 or early 880, following on immediately from the retreat both of Guthrum’s Vikings to a new state in East Anglia and the Viking army based at Fulham to the Continent, and that this was essentially a development of the system established in Wessex and eastern Mercia only a year or two before. The development of this new burh at London is seen as the key to Alfred’s control at this
Streets:
Ae – Aetheling Street
Ag – Aldgate Street
B – Bishopsgate Street
BoL – Botolph Lane
Br – Bread Street
Bro – Broad Street
BL – Bow Lane
Bu – Bucklersbury
C – Cannon Street
(Candlewick Street / Candelburyhtstrete)
DH – Dunstan’s Hill
E – Eastcheap
F – Fenchurch Street
FSH – Fish Street Hill
GaH – Garlick Hill
Gr – Gracechurch Street
Lo – Lombard Street
M – Mincing Lane
Mi – Miles Lane
MH – St Mary’s Hill
N – Newgate Street
P – Paternoster Street / Row
Po – Poultry
RL – Rood Lane
W – Wood Street
WFM – West Fish Market

Gates:
Asg – Aldersgate
Ag – Aldgate
Bg – Bishopsgate
Cr – Cripplegate
Lg – Ludgate
Ng – Newgate
StPg – ‘St Peter’s Gate’

Fig 1. London in the time of King Alfred

Churches:
HT – Holy Trinity Aldgate
St Au – St Augustine
St G – St Gregory
St H – St Helen’s Bishopsgate
St M – St Martin le Grand
St Ma – St Martin
St P – St Peter ad Vincula

Hithes:
B – Billingsgate
BW – Botolph Wharf
D – Dowgate
G – Garlickhithe
Q – Queenhithe
(Aethelred’s hithe)
time over the former kingdom of Mercia. This basic model provides the key to why London was not included in the Burghal Hidage document, which as it stands is likely to be complete (Hill 1996a, 93). The answer is straightforward: the creation of the document in the context of the setting out of the system, which has been argued by the writer as being created in the period AD 878–9 (Haslam 2005; 2009, 111–13), precedes by a year or two the occasion when London itself was set out as a burh, which thesis is argued in this paper.

The development of a model

It is the purpose here to examine the topographical, archaeological and historical evidence which will allow the detailed development of a hypothesis or model characterising both the physical and functional development of the new burghal space of London, which in the writer’s view supports the basic premise of the formation of a burh within the former Roman defences of London at this time. This model will hopefully serve, in Derek Keene’s words, to connect these details ‘in sufficiently coherent yet flexible hypotheses, which will interact and be capable of correcting each other as more material comes to hand’ (Keene 1992, 108) — as well as reflecting the new insights derived from a reassessment of the political and historical background. The methodology of this paper is to test the hypothesis of the development of a burh in London in AD 879–80 (which is indicated by a consideration of the wider political context) by establishing whether this hypothesis is or is not consistent with this evidence, and to suggest ways in which this evidence can be re-evaluated in relation to the model as a whole. In doing this, reasons will be given for modifying the model for London’s early development (Milne 1990; Milne 2001), and for questioning the current paradigm relating to the origin of London Bridge.

The new burghal space

The reasons which lay behind the creation of the burh at London in late AD 879 or early 880 are not far to seek. The attacks by the Vikings on London in AD 842 and 851, as well as the occupation of London by the Viking army in AD 871–2, can only have shown that the safety of London, with its long history as an economic, political, commercial and indeed symbolic royal hub, would have to be protected by its recreation within the safe space of the Roman walled area as a new burh, the security of which would be guaranteed not only by refurbished defences but also by a functioning garrison. Furthermore, King Alfred’s assumption of control over Mercia on the departure of the Vikings in late AD 879, creating a new political entity (Haslam forthcoming a), also meant that London, positioned at its approaches from the east, would have been seen as a site of high strategic importance. It would be expected therefore that Alfred would have provided both the physical and the institutional framework within and by which these functions could be implemented as part of its establishment as a new burh from its beginnings. As well as refurbished defences and gates, this framework within this defended enceinte — which it is convenient to characterise here as the ‘burghal space’ — would have included a market or markets and a new layout of streets which connected wharfs or hithes on the river to the markets and gates, would have provided for the layout of associated hagae and burgage plots, and would also have included some features inherited from the past. A further element of this new institution would have been a new or reconstructed bridge over the river.

This framework had already formed the pattern of those new urban foundations which Alfred had set up as part of the system of fortified towns of just a little while earlier (it is argued in AD 878–9; see Haslam 2005) in Wessex and eastern Mercia which are listed in the Burghal Hidage, of which Winchester, with its new regularly-planned street system, is in many respects the type. Martin Biddle argued persuasively some time ago that the street system of Winchester (as of other burhs listed in the Burghal Hidage) was laid out to implement a ‘policy of urban formation ... which was a deliberate expression of the organisation and apportionment of land for permanent habitation’ (Biddle 1973, 251; cf also Biddle & Hill 1971, 78–85; Biddle 1976b). Although Biddle sees this as ‘a response to the military situation at the time of Alfred’s
regain’ (Biddle 1973, 251), the arguments put forward by the writer for the formation of these burhs in the period AD 878–9 can only mean that their street systems (including the intramural street) were established — though not necessarily fully completed — at this time. The primacy of the intramural ‘walkway’ or street in the process of the setting out of all four sides of the defences of the burh shown in excavations at Cricklade (Haslam 2003, per 1) supports Biddle’s conclusions, and serves to emphasise the direct inter-relationship between the street systems and the defences of burhs, as primary components in the organisation of the burhgal space for both defence and habitation. This is shown in Fig 1 as running round the inside of the defences of London, though this is only indicated by later topographical evidence rather than by connections with streets which can be demonstrated (as at Winchester) as being early or indeed primary.

It has also been argued that another manifestation of the organisation of the new burhgal space to reflect the new social and military organisation of the burh in London can be seen in the formation of ‘wards’ around the gates of the burh, each possibly with its own church, which were set up at this time to act as territorial divisions which would have facilitated the maintenance and manning of the walls and gates by the new inhabitants of the burh (Haslam 1988); this is discussed further below. As the writer observed, these wards and their constituent parishes on the eastern side extend to an extramural boundary which Derek Keene has recently suggested was the city’s jurisdictional boundary, which also acted as a ‘killing field’ around the walls at the time of its restoration by Alfred (Keene 2003, 246). The underlying intention at this time would have been to create a new community whose overall military effectiveness in the long term would be guaranteed by its commercial and social sustainability.

THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND TOPOGRAPHICAL EVIDENCE

Streets and hithes

The archaeological evidence from excavations in various parts of the city is now detailed and specific enough to enable the construction of a conceptual model characterising the development of this new burhgal space which is capable of standing alongside that derived from those historical and strategic factors. Some (though not all) elements of the model put forward in this paper were anticipated by Gustav Milne (Milne 1990); this is critically appraisal below. By 1990 the available evidence seemed to demonstrate the early development of a primary focus around Queenhithe, to the west of the bridge, with streets which ran northwards from an open foreshore on the bank of the river to the south of the Roman riverside wall to join a primary market street along Cheapside (Fig 1). Bow Lane was laid out directly onto late Roman levels as a wide street which was later narrowed. The initial street can be dated to the first ceramic phase — broadly (but very imprecisely) to the late 9th/early 10th century (Horsman et al 1988, 28–30; Vince 1990, 22–4; Schofield 1990, 153–5). These observations were formalised by Tony Dyson, who concluded, on the basis of the documentary evidence of grants of AD 889 and 898 recording the existence of enclosures of the bishop of Worcester and the archbishop of Canterbury (the latter recorded as being defined by streets), that the streets in the vicinity (one of which was Bow Lane) were laid out in the period between these two grants (Dyson 1990, 106; 1992a, 17–18). He also concluded that the pair of streets which ran up in an unbroken line from Thames Street to Cheapside and were located to the west and east of Queenhithe respectively — Garlick Hill / Bow Lane (the medieval Cordwainer Street), together with Bread Street — represent ‘an integral matching pair ... deliberately laid out together as essential adjuncts of a harbour intended to restore external trade’ to the city (Dyson 1990, 106; cf Dyson 1992a, 16). This arrangement was ‘deliberately designed for optimum communication with the new harbour where no other means of access was available’ (Dyson 1992a, 18; cf Schofield 1990, 155). These streets, which included a newly laid out Cheapside (Dyson 1990, 106–7; Keene 1995, 108; Keene 2003, 245), are thus seen as representing ‘the basic framework for an immediate nucleus of settlement and commercial activity in the restored city, a
framework capable of further extension to the east or west as the need arose’ (Dyson 1990, 106). Similar views and conclusions are expressed by John Schofield (Schofield 1990, 153–5). This ‘gradualist’ interpretation, with its implication that the hithe at Queenhithe and the associated streets were the first of several to develop over a century or more, is however questioned in what follows. A more recent model put forward by Gustav Milne, developing his earlier work, to the effect that the first phase of urban development took place in c.AD 900 and that it occupied a limited area between Bread Street in the west and St Mary’s Hill in the east (Milne 2001), is also examined critically below.

While this conclusion is of great significance in understanding the early development of post-Roman London, its basic premise — that this marks a development of the late 880s or early 890s in response to its ‘restoration’ by Alfred and Æthelred after AD 886 — is questioned here. Dyson’s view is based partly on the received view that before this ‘restoration’ in AD 886 London was in the hands of the Vikings, and also on the inference that the absence of a reference to Bread Street in the charter of AD 889 implies its absence on the ground (Dyson 1990, 106; 1992a, 17–18; cf Vince 1990, 22, 126 and Schofield 1990, 153). These two premises are mutually validating, in that the inference about the absence of streets in AD 889, and their appearance in AD 898, appears to fit in neatly with the assumption that the ‘restoration’ of London and the layout of its basic street plan only began in AD 886. Both of these premises are, however, unsustainable. One of the reasons for the grant of the soke and its associated franchises by the king was to give the bishop of Worcester the privilege of tax-free trading within the area of the soke. This was defined in the charter as being in contra-distinction to trading in the public streets (in strata publica), which remained subject to taxation by the king. In other words, the privileges of the bishop’s franchise within the soke would be meaningless without the contemporary existence of neighbouring streets. Dyson’s view is also based on the questionable premise that the origin of the street as a functioning routeway is consequent upon the origin of the activity within the soke by its side. The existence of the street was, on the contrary, a function of the activity on the trading shore at Queenhithe — as is, of course, the presence of the soke at this particular position — for which there is archaeological evidence from the mid-9th century, and certainly in the early 880s (discussed below). Furthermore, trading activity in the soke, which it is argued below was established principally to accommodate the trade in salt from the bishop’s holdings of saltworks at Droitwich, would have required the existence of streets by that time to facilitate the movement of goods within the burh. All these considerations imply that this north–south street was in existence at a date which is earlier than the date of the grant.

Subsequent excavations on the site of Bull Wharf, on the downstream side of Queenhithe, have however provided crucial new evidence which bears on these conclusions about the early development of the area.¹ This evidence demonstrates the established use of the ‘trading shore’ (the ripa emptoralis in the charter of AD 889) from a period predating the ‘restoration’ of AD 886, and significantly strengthens the inferences about the early dating of these streets. The foreshore would have acted as a beach market, as elsewhere in Europe (Ellmers 1981), and in a fashion similar to the use of the foreshore along the Strand adjacent to the earlier wic. Traders would have required no more than a clear stretch of the foreshore, with perhaps a few mooring posts, and their activities would have left little structural evidence. However, the material evidence, though slight, included trestles supporting gangplanks for the mooring of boats, a barge bed and other ephemeral structures, aligned at an angle to the foreshore (Ayre & Wroe-Brown 1996a, 19–20). These are shown as having been in use in the 890s by the evidence of dendrochronological dating (Wroe-Brown 1999, 12–14). This early development of a foreshore trading area at Queenhithe was arguably facilitated by the existence of a gateway in the Roman riverside wall (Ayre & Wroe-Brown 1996a, 19; Blackmore 1997, 129; Wroe-Brown 1999, 13). The evidence from the foreshore itself, the product of the natural accumulation of silts and gravel layers since the Roman period, shows however that the deposits were subject to constant erosion.
and redeposition, with the result that there appears to have been little meaningful stratigraphic succession or demonstrable stratigraphic relationship between the foreshore deposits and the structures (Ayre & Wroe-Brown 1996a, 18–19; Wroe-Brown 1999). The origins of trading on this foreshore have been assigned to the 890s (Blackmore 1997, 130) — apparently premised upon Dyson’s overall model (above) and the received view that AD 886 marked the beginning of Alfred’s ‘restoration’ of London (Ayre & Wroe-Brown 1996a, 14). However, many metalwork finds of Scandinavian, Frankish and Carolingian origin from the primary foreshore, including two Northumbrian stycas of the 840s, show trading contacts with, amongst other areas, Haithabu, Birka and elsewhere in Scandinavia, and demonstrate that this was being used as a trading shore from the mid-9th century if not earlier (Blackmore 1997, 129–30).

Amongst the finds from the foreshore at Bull Wharf were three coins of the London Monogram type (Ayre & Wroe-Brown 1996a, 20; Wroe-Brown 1999, 13). The minting of these special coins at the time of Alfred’s resumption of control of London in late AD 879–80, combined with the short period of their circulation (Blackburn 1998, 110–11), demonstrates beyond doubt that the foreshore was being actively used for direct trading in the early 880s, that is, at the time of the very early years of the creation of the burh by Alfred argued in this paper. This evidence therefore directly undermines the current paradigm that the reorganisation and occupation of the area within the walls only began with Alfred’s ‘restoration’ of AD 886. This would carry the implication that the streets leading up from the waterfront at Queenhithe also belong to this period, and therefore at the latest to the beginnings of the setting out of the Alfredian burh in AD 879–80, argued here. Both the archaeological evidence for the layout of Garlick Hill / Bow Lane as a primary element in the post-Roman townscape, and the broad archaeological dating evidence for its layout, while not in themselves capable of demonstrating this, are certainly consistent with this model. This conclusion is reinforced by the existence of other early hithes at Garlickhithe and Timberhithe, to the east and west of Queenhithe, as well as Fishhithe further to the east, which have the hithe suffix which is characteristic of middle and late Saxon waterfront settlements. As Tony Dyson has observed, the existence of these hithes is ‘suggestive of an early concentration of commercial activity [along this part of the waterfront] stemming more or less directly from Alfred’s innovations at Queenhithe’ (Dyson 1992a, 19).

The presence of the many mid- to late 9th-century finds within the foreshore deposits shows however that the use of this facility did not suddenly begin with Alfred’s renewed interest in the intramural area. It would be reasonable to see this early trading activity as being generated in part by the role of Queenhithe in servicing the needs of the royal and ecclesiastical enclave around the cathedral from possibly the beginning or the middle of the 7th century, and the ‘proto-burh’ established there possibly in or by the 850s, whose function and layout in the western part of the intramural area have been examined by Martin Biddle (Biddle 1989, 23–6). This conclusion is perhaps supported by the concentration of middle Saxon finds from the area around St Paul’s (Vince 1988, 85 fig 41; Cowie 2001, 196; Cowie 2004, 204; Schofield et al 2008–9, 83–4), and by the presence of a mid-Saxon building underlying the earliest of the street surfaces of Bow Lane (Schofield 1990, 153). The Scandinavian and Frisian origin of many of the finds from Bull Wharf also suggests the presence of trading contacts of Viking inhabitants of London and its area who had possibly remained from the Viking military campaigns of the 840s, or during and after the over-wintering of AD 872–3, or more particularly from the period between AD 877 and late 879 when London and its area were in the political control of the Vikings (Haslam 2005; Blackmore 1997, 130–1). It is also argued elsewhere that the area to the east of the new Viking border of AD 877 on the line of the western boundary of Middlesex and Bedfordshire (which was replaced by Alfred and Guthrum’s frontier further to the east in AD 879), which formed London’s immediate environs and which included London itself, seems to have been subject to colonising pressures from the Scandinavians in a process which involved the displacement of a Saxon landholding population by a Danish one (Haslam 2005,
128; Haslam forthcoming a). It would be reasonable to suggest therefore that the Viking interests in trading and urban development were set in motion by their stay in London, at least in the late 870s, and that by taking control of London in AD 877 they perhaps saw an opportunity to expand their field of influence over a new area.² It is therefore equally probable that a component of the original population of Alfred’s burh of AD 879–80 would have included many of the Scandinavians who had settled and traded in London in the previous two years or so. The activity on the foreshore at Queenhithe before CAD 880 might well, therefore, have been connected to the St Paul’s area by the precursor of perhaps the westernmost street of the pair of primary streets described above.

A parallel to the early development of the streets leading from Queenhithe to Cheapside are the two streets comprising the approach road to London Bridge (Fish Street Hill) and Botolph Lane to its east, which connects Fenchurch Street with the river. The earliest layer of Botolph Lane, composed of cobbles carefully laid directly onto late Roman levels, is dated archaeologically (by pottery of the first phase) to the late 9th/early 10th century (Horsman et al 1988, 14–16). Settlement alongside Fish Street Hill, on the line of the approach road to London Bridge, is taken as dating the use of the street to ‘the initial phases of the Saxon re-occupation’, which forms the basis for the conclusion that this was contemporary with Botolph Lane (Horsman et al 1988, 21). It seems significant that similar building types of the primary phase have been found at both Bow Lane and Fish Street Hill (Schofield 1990, 154), reinforcing the inferences suggesting contemporaneity. The recognition of these streets as primary elements in the layout of the new burh of Alfred, and therefore of the late 9th century, has suggested that St Mary Hill, the next street to the east, which exhibits the same topographical characteristics in leading in a straight course from the river to Fenchurch Street to the north, is also of this date (Horsman et al 1988, 112; Keene 1990; Keene 2003, 245). Since Fish Street Hill was the street leading to the Saxon London Bridge, the archaeological evidence also implies the existence of the bridge at this time (discussed in detail below). That Fish Street Hill leads through the town from the Roman and Saxon bridge towards Bishopsgate to the north-east, via Gracechurch Street and Bishopsgate Street (straight through the middle of the former Roman Forum) (see Fig 1), shows it to have been a primary routeway of the post-Roman intramural landscape.

Excavations at the site of New Fresh Wharf and Billingsgate have established the presence of a gate or gap in the Roman riverside wall immediately to the south of Botolph Lane, which was associated with a late Saxon inlet (Steedman & Schofield 1992, 96–7). The late 9th-century origin of the street, and the use of the foreshore in the Saxon period, which was developed actively from the late 10th century, might suggest that both street and harbour developed as a result of the use of the foreshore as a trading or mooring shore in the 9th century, and therefore in the early days of the origin of the Alfredian burh.³ The lack of dateable foreshore deposits of this period has, however, led to doubts on the part of both Tony Dyson and John Schofield that this was a late 9th-century trading shore (Dyson 1992a, 20; Schofield 1992, 133). But the archaeological evidence indicates a ‘mid-Saxon river bank made up of late Roman dumped deposits and the silted-up remains of the partially-robbed Roman quay, overlain in places by foreshore deposits’ (Steedman & Schofield 1992, 98). The continued erosion and disturbance of these levels, only halted by man-made dumping prior to the construction of the late 10th/early 11th-century embankments (Steedman & Schofield 1992, 96), is not a situation which would have been conducive to the degree of preservation of particular foreshore deposits which was seen, for instance, at Bull Wharf, where late Saxon levels, though disturbed to varying degrees by natural erosion, survived to an extent. It was noted that ‘no formal structures [for this activity] were required, and very little archaeological evidence [for it] would be expected to survive’ (Steedman 1992, 118). There can in these circumstances be no evidential value in the absence of foreshore deposits of the late 9th century to indicate absence of activity at this period. It cannot therefore be inferred that there was not a 9th-century trading beach (another ripa emporalis) at this spot, nor can the
evidence (or the lack of it) bear the weight of Dyson's conclusion that the process of 'the resettlement of the intramural city [around the bridgehead] does not appear to have been taken in hand until after the middle of the 10th century' (Dyson 1992a, 20). An alternative explanation for the apparent lack of use of the foreshore in the 9th century has been put forward by Brian Hobley, who suggests that settlement began in the 9th century at the northern end of St Botolph's Street, moving downhill towards the harbour which was then developed in the later 10th century (Hobley 1988, 76). This is, however, predicated on the lack of evidence of a late 9th-century trading shore at New Fresh Wharf, which (as above) can more reasonably be explained by the demonstrable operation of subsequent processes of erosion. Neither does this view address the issue of the purpose of the laying out of the street in the late 9th century in the first place, if it was not to connect the rest of the town to a contemporaryhithe. Alan Vince reflects received opinion in regarding the area as a development of the 10th century (Vince 1990, 127), a premise which also underlies Gustav Milne's analysis of the development of the wards in these parts (Milne 2001, 129–31), which is discussed further below.

The association of St Mary's Hill with another early harbour at Billingsgate at its southern end, and of possibly another gap or gate in the riverside wall associated with an inlet to the west of that at the end of Botolph Lane (Steedman & Scofield 1992, 99), reinforces the suggestion that the whole length of this foreshore area downstream of the bridge is likely to have been utilised as a trading shore from the early days of the formation of the burh by Alfred, of which the laying out of the two streets (Botolph Lane / Philpot Lane and St Mary's Hill / Rood Lane), as well as of Fish Street Hill and the use of the bridge, to connect this activity with the rest of the town was a direct and necessary functional expression. Another street which may be considered as a primary component of the Alfredian burh is Dowgate Hill, immediately to the east of the course of the Walbrook, to the west of the bridge. As with the other streets cited above, it runs in an unbroken line northwards from the river along the eastern bank of the Walbrook to the line of Cheapside (in this case to the position of the junction of Fenchurch Street with the eastern end of Cheapside / Poultry at the crossing of the Walbrook), and is associated with an early wharf or hithe on the river at Dowgate, positioned at the mouth of the Walbrook, which was certainly being used as such by the mid-11th century.

There are other aspects of the layout of the town at this period that are relevant to the model of the formation of the burh in AD 879–80. A further element in the original street layout appears to be the east–west street Trinity Lane, earlier known as Athelingstrecte, now Watling Street (Ekwall 1954, 81–2; Keene 1990, 180; Keene 2003, 245). This street runs from the west up Ludgate Hill, through the Roman gateway following the alignment of a Roman road, past the Saxon cathedral on its northern side, and through the presumed east gate of the cathedral precinct (Schofield et al 2008–9, 81 fig 3, 84). To the east of St Paul's it runs parallel to another east–west lane (West Fish Market) mentioned in the grant of AD 889 as lying immediately north of the plot of the bishop of Worcester. Topographical evidence suggests that the street running past St Paul's would have been the most important in terms of general accessibility within the burh, and may therefore be dated with certainty to the primary stages of the layout of the burh, if not indeed somewhat earlier (a consideration discussed further below). These two streets converge at the line of Walbrook — though the junction is somewhat staggered in the later street pattern — to cross the stream by what could be inferred as being a new bridge. This also carries the implication that Cannon Street (medieval Candelwick Street or Candelwurichstrete) (Ekwall 1954, 79), which continues this alignment eastwards, is another primary street of the Saxon town. Candelwick Street extends from this point (the eastern side of the Walbrook and a crossroads with the primary Dowgate Street) in a straight line to the primary Fish Street Hill. Previous work on the Roman street pattern here has suggested that this was one of the few streets in the Saxon town to follow the line of a Roman street, but recent archaeological work has demonstrated that this is not an exact alignment. This emphasises how the straight alignment of
Cannon Street must therefore represent an episode of post-Roman replanning. It continues in an unbroken line to the east of the bridge along Eastcheap towards a Roman and Saxon gate on the site of the Tower of London (St Peter’s Gate), the existence of which has been demonstrated by the writer some time ago (Haslam 1988; cf Tatton-Brown 1986, 22).

It is also significant that side streets run from this main street in a staggered arrangement to north and south, showing a ladder-like pattern which is evidenced for instance at Winchester, amongst other late Saxon planned towns (Biddle & Hill 1971). It would be consistent with the regular layout of this area in 8-pole modules (Crummy 1979, 150 & fig 8.3, 159), together with the archaeological evidence adduced above and its connections within the townscape, to infer that this was a single plan unit which was laid out at one moment in time. It can be reasonably inferred from its parallels with the street systems of other burhs of the Burghal Hidage that this block of streets was planned and laid out as an early, probably primary, component of the Alfredian new town of AD 879–80. These arguments derived from the topographical observations of the context of this plan unit within the new burghal space arc furthermore supported by the archaeological evidence, which indicates that Miles Lane is also of late 9th-century date (Schofield 1990, 155). The fact that this street comprises the south-eastern component of the ‘ladder’ pattern of streets leading off Candlewick Street demonstrates that this whole plan unit was laid out as a development which formed an integral component of the initial planning of the street system. This new development can be recognised, furthermore, as extending to the east of Fish Street Hill to include the two or three streets to its east, where it ends in what may well have been a market area, now filled in.

Cheapside and the internal development of the burh

Excavations at No. 1 Poultry in the mid-1990s have shown that the alignment of Cheapside / Poultry at its eastern end appears to have been shifted northwards from that of its Roman predecessor, heading for a new crossing (by inference a bridge) over the Walbrook. Associated with this on the southern side was an early market area, reusing convenient Roman street surfaces (Treveil & Rowsome 1999, 284–5; Treveil & Burch 1996, 55–6), which the excavator suggests may have occupied the whole area between Poultry on the north, Bucklersbury to the south and the Walbrook to the east (Treveil & Burch 1996, 55). The western end of Cheapside is also clearly aligned on the corner of the earlier precinct of St Paul’s and the probable site of the early folk-moot of London, rather than on Newgate. This emphasises the fact that its whole length is skewed from the alignment of the Roman street which formerly led in an almost straight line from Newgate eastwards to the southern side of the Roman Forum on the east side of the Walbrook. These observations demonstrate that Cheapside as a whole was newly laid out on this alignment in the post-Roman period — a conclusion reinforced by the fact that parts of the original Roman street appear to have still been visible in the late Saxon period (Treveil & Burch 1996, 56). The association of this street with the primary streets leading from the Queenhithe area, and the large scale of this episode of replanning, would be consistent with its origin as a primary component in the layout of the new burh of Alfred in c. AD 880 before any significant occupation had developed in the area. This conclusion seems to be supported by the observation of its primary surface, which was composed of large cobbles (Vince 1990, 124). As pointed out above, the primacy of Cheapside as an original component of the newly laid out burghal space has also been discussed by other writers (Dyson 1990, 106–7; Schofield 1990, 155; Keene 1990, 178–9; 2003, 245).

As Keene has shown, these topographical considerations argue against the hypothesis of Tim Tatton-Brown, who suggested that Cheapside is a secondary planned development of the early 10th century, replacing an earlier through-route from Ludgate past St Paul’s Cathedral (Tatton-Brown 1986, 26), and that Newgate Street is a later development of c.1100 (Tatton-Brown 1986, 23–4). These are unsustainable inferences, in that they ignore the interconnecting network of streets as a fundamental functional and
spatial attribute of the burghal space. The latter proposition is based on the untenable assumption that the dating of the church of the Holy Sepulchre outside Newgate dates the first construction of the street and the use of the gate. The siting of the apparently unplanned market at the east end of Cheapside, at the crossing of the Walbrook by streets from the east (described below), suggests that this could well have been a feature of the early to mid-9th-century townscape, accessed from the west via the original Roman street. The replanning of Cheapside/Poultry and the inferred new bridge over the Walbrook at its eastern end which must be associated with its new alignment can be seen as accommodating this established market area as a key functional element in the new burghal space. The development of Newgate Street from Newgate, which gives access to the western end of this new market street, must also have been a planned component of the new townscape. It is possible to interpret the new use of this gate and the streets leading to it and from it as the replacement of an earlier principle entrance to the walled area through Ludgate, running past St Paul's, which led directly from the principle street of the wic to its west. This is possibly supported by the name of Ludgate itself, which means 'a back door, postern' (Ekwall 1954, 91) — which in terms of movement within the new burh it would have become.

Spatially associated with this new bridge over the Walbrook at the eastern end of Cheapside/Poultry are the three main streets of the north-eastern part of the Roman walled area — Lombard Street/Fenchurch Street, Cornhill/Leadenhall Street, both leading to Aldgate, and Broad Street/Bishopsgate Street, leading to Bishopsgate. Together with the street leading northwards from the bridgehead towards Bishopsgate (Fish Street Hill/Gracechurch Street/Bishopsgate), the continuous lines of these streets mark out these routes as being primary elements in the morphology of the Saxon town. In connecting the gates with the central market area just to the west of Walbrook described above, they possibly originated at a period earlier than Alfred's suggested replanning in AD 879–80 as customary 'desire paths' between nodal points in the townscape in areas which were only sparsely occupied. The courses of these roads must to some extent have been determined by the survival of the structure of the Roman Forum, though not its original function (Vince 1990, 123; Milne 1992, 34–8). Their point of convergence at the eastern end of the new bridgehead over the Walbrook on the eastern end of the newly laid out line of Cheapside/Poultry shows that the establishment of this was also a significant topographical feature of the landscape of the new town of the 880s, and that it was therefore one of its primary components. Its association with the large open market area to its west (above) is altogether unsurprising. This new bridge over the Walbrook, once it had been established, must in functional terms have been one of the key nodal points in the whole of the intramural landscape, to which the footfall of most of the inhabitants of the new town — as well as those travellers approaching from points north or east — would at one time or another have been directed. It would have been comparable to the gates in the Roman walls and the bridge as a primary topographical determinant. Indeed, the market area on its western side is analogous in both functional and topographical terms to the hithes on the river connected to streets leading from them into the town, in that these spaces were sited at junctions of communication between contrasting spatial and topographical zones. Tony Dyson has aptly remarked of these streets that their 'degraded courses' showed 'more concern for rapid transit than for any settled occupation alongside them' (Dyson 1992a, 14; cf Vince 1990, 123). This central bridging point over the Walbrook was also a determinant in the layout of the street at Dowgate Hill/Walbrook, also suggested above as being a primary component of the new burghal space of the late 9th century.

Another candidate for a primary street of the new burh is Wood Street, which like all the others considered as being components of the new burghal space, ran for some distance in an uninterrupted course, in this case from Cheapside in a direct line northwards through the area of the former Roman Cripplegate fort to the gate at Cripplegate. It is significant that Wood Street does not follow the alignment of the earlier north–south Roman street running
southwards from this gate either within the fort or southwards from its south gate, but veers eastwards from this alignment. It can be inferred from this that Wood Street was laid out when the south wall of the fort was not a major obstacle, but while the area was still relatively unoccupied. It is also significant that the church of St Alban was built on its eastern side, by inference after the street was laid out. This has a bearing on the question as to whether the church might be considered as being the chapel of the former royal palace of Offa of the late 8th century (Dyson & Schofield 1984, 306–9; Biddle 1989, 23; Vince 1990, 54–5; Dyson 1990, 109 n 48; cf Keene 2003, 236 n 6). This idea has now, however, been effectively exploded by recent work on the archaeology and topography of the area (Milne 2001, 127–9), which has also shown that the inner walls of the Cripplegate fort had disappeared by the end of the Roman period (Milne 2001, 132). These walls cannot therefore have constituted a topographical constraint or determinant in the post-Roman period, or have formed an enclosed precinct with possible royal or high status functions, as previously suggested (Haslam 1987a; Biddle 1989, 23). Other aspects of Milne’s model for the development of both the Cripplegate fort area, and the internal burghal space in general, is critically analysed below.

Other elements of the primary burghal space would probably have included the great extramural cattle market at Smithfield, approached from the north by a drove road (of possibly pre-Roman origin) along St John Street (Grimes 1968, 43–5 & esp fig 8; Vince 1990, 123, 129). This would have been readily accessible to the western end of Cheapside via the gate at Newgate to its south. If Cheapside was replanned on a different axis to its Roman predecessor in the initial phase of the setting out of the new burghal space by Alfred, as already argued, then the street leading to its western end from Newgate must also be included as a necessary functional element of this new layout. Since it meets Cheapside at a point which was decidedly skew to the alignment of the Roman street leading from Newgate eastwards to the Forum, both must have been laid out in a single episode of urban planning. Newgate Street would logically have been associated with a street leading southwards to it from Aldersgate, though the comparatively slight build-up of post-Roman street surfaces of Aldersgate Street outside the walls suggests that this was not a major thoroughfare in the Saxon period (Haslam 1973). With the recognition of the primacy of Cheapside in the layout of the new burghal space (above), the suggestion of the existence of a primary street leading southwards from Aldersgate to connect with the Ludgate Hill axis (Tatton Brown 1986, 23) cannot now be accepted. Newgate Street also appears to have been associated with three regularly spaced streets on its south side, which curve round to the east in parallel to meet a street which could be argued as running around the north edge of the enclosed area or burh forming the precinct of St Paul’s cathedral. Although there is no archaeological dating evidence for these streets, their functional and spatial association is consistent with their having being laid out in this primary phase of replanning.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MODEL

The aspects of the common-sense functionality of these elements in the townscape, which would recognise connections between the wharves, the main market streets or areas and the primary Roman gateways, and the inferences which can be drawn concerning their contemporaneity, cast some doubt on the model for the development of intramural London propounded by Gustav Milne (Milne 1990; Milne 2001, 119–31). Milne sees the primary core of the newly replanned town as comprising a group of streets in the centre of the intramural space, occupying an area between the east side of St Paul’s in the west, Cheapside to the north and St Mary’s Hill to the east (Milne 1990; Milne 1999; Milne 2001, 121, fig 140). None of these streets is, however, seen as being connected to any of the Roman gates, and since the existence of the bridge at this time is denied (a commonly-held but flawed paradigm which is discussed further below), its only means of access would have been from the river. I would suggest that this scheme makes little topographical sense, in that it ignores the all-important aspects of the connection of the streets of this central core with the world outside.
the walls, which alone would have made possible the functioning of the intramural space as a *port* and a *burh* — a market and a defended *enceinte*. Furthermore, Milne states that this early core should be dated to ‘c.900’. Not only does this curious date bear no relationship to any significant political or military development which could have impinged on London; it also places this development after the reign of Alfred, for whose primary interventions in London’s development there is a comparative wealth of well-documented evidence (for instance the two land grants of AD 889 and 898 (see Dyson 1978) and the reference in the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* for AD 886). As the arguments in this paper and elsewhere make clear (Haslam forthcoming a), this whole process should be assigned to a short period after late AD 879, almost a full generation before Milne’s start date.

Allied to Milne’s concept of the primary development of the burh occupying a restricted core area is the idea that the outer areas of the intramural space were given over to agricultural use, in support of which Milne cites the agricultural connotations of various street names given by Ekwall (Ekwall 1954), as well as the presence of the so-called ‘dark earth’ overlying Roman features. These include Cornhill (referring to fields where cereals were grown), Hoggen Lane, Milk Street, Seething Lane (where corn was threshed), Addle Street (a cattle drove road), and Warmanacre (tilled field belonging to Waerman). The interpretation of these as indicating ‘agricultural activity’ over the whole area is, however, the end result of a series of tendentious and often insecurely founded assumptions about the meanings of these names in post-Conquest settings. Cornhill could as easily refer to a market where corn was sold (as suggested by Stow, Ekwall 1954, 186); Milk Street to a street where milk was sold (Ekwall 1954, 76) rather than to cattle pasture; Hoggen Lane where pigs were kept (a characteristic shared by every other street in the city, Ekwall 1954, 56); and Seething Lane to a place more concerned with processing and sale of corn than its production. The interpretation of Addle Street as a ‘drove road’ is furthermore highly improbable; in terms of the long distance movement of livestock from field to market, which is what the word means, Addle Street leads from nowhere to nowhere. Furthermore, the origin of the ‘dark earth’ is debatable. Recent research on this ubiquitous feature has suggested that it was not the product of agricultural activity, but rather of abandonment (Cowie 2008, 50).

**Sokes and wards**

The origins of the sokes and wards of London also have a bearing on this question. Ekwall’s interpretation of the meaning of *Wermearcerer* as the ‘field, arable land’ of Waermen (Ekwall 1954, 38), quoted by Milne, is open to doubt. It had shops and stalls, and was connected to a wharf, in the grant of the property to the church of St Peter of Ghent in 1044 (though this grant is probably a mid-12th-century forgery, Brooke & Keir 1975, 368), and was described as a soke (*soca*) in the 13th century (*ibid*). The connotation of ‘soke’ in this case (*ie* an area over which the holder exercised privileged immunities, Roffe 2007, 120–3) is supported by several instances in Domesday where various tenants-in-chief held ‘acres’ in Wallingford (DB Berks, sections B.2 & B.3), all of which contained a number of tenements. In these instances these ‘acres’ can best be interpreted as high status sokes, and clearly had nothing to do with agricultural activities. The presence of other sokes at Domesday within London which were appurtenant to rural estates in surrounding counties, most of which held a number of tenements (Campbell 1971, 131–4), suggests that these are likely to have been a ubiquitous feature of the internal layout of the burh from an early period. This is supported by the evidence from Winchester, in which large tenements or sokes were apportioned to various landholders from the foundation of the burh, as part of the process of the repopulation of the burh (Biddle & Keene 1976, 452–4). A similar pattern in which the burghal space was subdivided into large blocks or tenements can be discerned at Oxford (Blair 1994, 151–2, 156; Dodd 2003, 29–31), and to some extent also at Wallingford (Roffe 2009).

This overall view is supported by the evidence of the involvement of the bishop of London, who held a soke in Cornhill and Bishopsgate, as well as two others to the south
of St Paul’s and in Holborn (Taylor 1980). Pamela Taylor’s analysis has shown that the soke centred on Cornhill was a compact but extensive area which included Bishopsgate ward (both intra- and extramural, and which encompassed Bishopsgate Street), Cornhill and Lime Street wards (encompassing the western two-thirds of Cornhill), part of the area to the west of Cornhill ward (and probably lying immediately to the east of the main crossing of Walbrook), part of Langbourne ward (encompassing Fenchurch Street), and the northern part of Bridge ward (encompassing Gracechurch Street) (Taylor 1980, 175; see also Brooke & Keir 1975, 151–3 for the wards). The area of the soke (approximate in detail) is shown in Fig 1. As already discussed, these streets formed the major routeways connecting the primary market at Cheapside to the west of Walbrook with the city gates, as well as the street leading northwards from the bridge, which had probably developed in their final form in the 880s. Although evidence for the existence, extent and function of the bishop’s soke is late and fragmentary, it is clear that it must originally have comprised a well-defined but extensive area occupying a major portion of the central part of the city east of Walbrook, apart from the stretch of land nearest to the waterfront. Taylor has suggested that its main function was jurisdictional, but the survival of the right to take limited tolls at Bishopsgate (Taylor 1980, 181) implies that the rights of the bishop to market dues and toll rights had perhaps once been somewhat more extensive.

Taylor has suggested that the existence of this soke has its origin as part of the foundation endowment to the see of London in AD 604, which included a large area of 24 hides to the east of London. There are, however, some difficulties with this interpretation. As is shown clearly in Fig 1, the boundaries of the soke are such as to suggest that it was fitted into an area which was also occupied by other major land divisions, in particular the ward or soke of Aldgate to its east, as well as the pattern of late Saxon streets. Furthermore, the characteristics of the soke as an area within which the bishop had jurisdictional rights, as well as originally probably rather more extensive rights to tolls and markets than is apparent from its late documentation, is more indicative of an origin as a specifically urban soke, in which streets were not only defined but also occupied to some extent by tenements, and where goods were moved through the gates and sold in markets. None of these features would have been appropriate to, or characteristic of, conditions in the early 7th century. On the other hand, the extent of the soke shows that it could only have been formed at an early stage in the process of development of the urban space to the east of Walbrook. The conclusion must be that the soke as a whole, in whatever its original form, represented a grant by the king to the bishop in the earliest stages of the setting out of the new burghal space, either in the late 9th century, as part of a process by which the whole of the eastern part of the intramural and immediately extramural area was subdivided, or possibly in an earlier phase of burghal formation, such as the late 8th century. It would be consistent with this interpretation to suggest that Cornhill was originally developed as a market within the bishop’s soke for produce from the cathedral’s large manor of Stepney to the east. This example is interesting in illustrating how the royal interests in the development of the new burh of London — as of other burhs — were facilitated by partnerships with the main movers and shakers of the period, which is also shown clearly in relation to the interests in London in the later 9th century of the bishop of Worcester, ealdorman Aethelred and the archbishop of Canterbury, discussed further below.

This perceived pattern of the lack of development of the areas which were peripheral to the postulated ‘core area’ of the primary burghal space might be considered to be given some support by the pattern of growth of the parish churches, particularly those with Scandinavian dedications (St Olave, St Bride’s, St Clement and St Alpaffe) (Milne 2001, 126–7 & fig 144). This analysis does not, however, take into account the existence of an earlier pattern, which the writer has examined in detail as it can be discerned in the eastern part of the intramural area (Haslam 1988). Milne’s model of a ‘city-wide pattern of progressive expansion from the core area’, which is partly based on his assumption of the early 12th-century foundation for
Holy Trinity Aldgate just inside the gate, is somewhat confounded not only by the existence and extent of the bishop’s soke, analysed above, but also by the evidence of the earlier existence of Holy Trinity, or its predecessor, as an earlier minster. This can also be recognised as being part of a more general pattern of the development of other churches of similar status which can be recognised at St Peter ad Vincula on the site of the Tower of London (and inside a pre-Conquest gateway which was blocked by the insertion of the Tower) and possibly either St Helen’s Bishopsgate, in an equivalent position just inside Bishopsgate, or St Peter’s Cornhill (Haslam 1988, 35–6, 38). Each of these was arguably associated with a large area both inside and outside the walls. The writer has argued that, at least in the eastern part of London, these areas constituted the urban parochiae of urban ‘sub-ministers’ which formed the basis of the structure of the wards, and which are seen as forming part of a new territorial organisation of the new burghal space which was put in place by Alfred to facilitate the defence of the gates and their adjacent lengths of walls (Haslam 1988, 38–41). St Helen’s or St Peter’s Cornhill may well have functioned as the urban sub-minister of the bishop of London’s soke, of which the ward of Bishopsgate formed a part (discussed above).

All of this evidence is inconsistent with the idea that otherwise unorganised spaces in the intramural area other than a hypothesised ‘core area’ were given over to essentially non-urban agricultural activities. Combined with the analogies from other burhs, it demonstrates, on the contrary, the existence of a complex organised urban landscape within the whole of the intramural space which had been formed at an early stage in the development of the burh in London. This may be inferred to have been set out as part of a unified plan to facilitate the overall aims of defence and the creation of a sustainable urban community. This is, however, not to deny that many areas would have been developed subsequently by a process of infilling and expansion, with a population whose detritus appears to indicate (as in the intramural Cripplegate area) a steady expansion of the development of houses and activities throughout the 10th century (Milne 2001, 122–6).

THE PRECURSOR OF THE NEW BURH

All these considerations combine to show that London is likely to have been recreated as a formally established burh at this time, concentrating many of the royal functions shown in the middle Saxon wic along the Strand (albeit by then only a shadow of its former self in the first half of the 9th century) within the Roman walled area (Biddle 1989, 28–9). It would, for instance, have combined the functions of the ecclesiastical and royal area around St Paul’s Cathedral (Paulisburh) (Biddle 1989, 23 n 36), which before the late 9th century would have included royal and ecclesiastical residences, the cathedral, the houses of the minters, a place of public assembly in the Roman amphitheatre nearby (though this — if it could be demonstrated — was possibly replaced at an early date by the development of the site of the folkmoot to the north of St Paul’s), and several lesser residential enclosures (Biddle 1989, 23–7). The notional extent of this precinct is shown in Fig 1. The western extent of this precinct appears to be indicated by a stream or managed watercourse, possibly of Roman origin but open in the middle Saxon period, flowing south-westwards some 70m west of the front of Wren’s cathedral, which is followed by later ward boundaries (Askew & Rowsome 2007; Schofield et al 2008–9, 80–1 & fig 3).

The whole complex would have been ‘a reserved enclosure associated with the exercise of royal power’ (Keene 2003, 236–7). This view seems to be supported by the record in the Chronicle of the attack by the Vikings on Lundenburh in AD 851, suggested by Biddle as being a reference to the walled city (Biddle 1989, 29 n 95; cf Keene 2003, 239), but just as probably referring to the ‘burh’ around St Paul’s. Functions such as the control and regulation of trade and the witnessing of transactions, already overseen by the king’s ‘wic-reeve’ (wicgerefa) from the king’s hall, and situated either in the wic outside the walls to the west (Biddle 1989; Keene 2003, 236–7), or at Westminster (Cowie 2001), would be likely to have been relocated to the more securely defended burghal space within the walls, either at this period or in the 880s. It could also be reasonably argued that the important soke of Ceolmundinghaga,
granted to the bishop of Worcester by Burgred in AD 857, 'which is situated not far from the west gate' (Whitelock 1979, 529), would have formed part of this royal and ecclesiastical enclosure. Other evidence of early occupation lies in the alignment of the early churches of St Martin, St Gregory, St Paul's, St Augustine and St Pancras, noted by Tim Tatton-Brown (Tatton-Brown 1986, 23; cf Brooke & Keir 1975, 140–1). However, it is clear from the archaeological evidence of the abandonment — or at least, the severe retraction — of the middle Saxon trading site or wic along the Strand to the west from the middle of the 9th century that the process by which Alfred created the burh of late AD 879–880 did not involve transposing a needy population from one site outside the walls to another inside, as has been suggested by several commentators (Tatton-Brown 1986; Biddle 1989, 29; Dyson 1990, 101, 102). Rather, it would have required the establishment of a new institution in which a new population would be installed, who would have new responsibilities and privileges, and who would be under the king's control in a way which they were not outside the burh.

There are indications, however, that this process was not as dramatically novel as might be supposed. Rather than being a reference to the whole of the walled area, the Viking attack on Lundenburh in AD 851 might have referred to the precinct around St Paul's, rather than the whole walled city as Martin Biddle has suggested (Biddle 1989, 29 n 95). This could by this time have been created — if it was not already functioning — as a high status fortified enclosure, a 'burh' in itself, which would have acted not only to protect the cathedral and the bishop and his household, but also as a refuge for the king and as a safeguard for functions such as minting. This is possibly the context for the high status finds dating from the middle of the 9th century onwards recovered from excavations at Queenhithe, and for the apparent concentration of finds of the 8th and 9th centuries around and to the south of St Paul's (Vince 1988, 85 fig 41; Vince 1990, 57; Cowie 2001; Cowie 2004, 204; Schofield, et al 2008–9, 83–4), which has been pointed out above. The suggestion that other functions were relocated to the safety of the walled area at this period is supported by the acquisition in AD 857 of the commercial soke by the bishop of Worcester from King Burgred at Ceolmundinghaga, mentioned above, to replace one in the area of the more vulnerable former wic (Kelly 1992, 12), which, as argued below, was connected with the bishop's long-term interests in the trade and marketing of salt from Droitwich.\footnote{This appears to have been one of several high status sokes within the walled area which included Staeninghaga around St Mary Staining and possibly the haga of Hlothere of Kent, which appears to have been a royal reserved area or soke where Kentish merchants could obtain warranty from the 7th century onwards, and which has been taken as being indicated by the name Lothbury (Brooke & Keir 1975, 154; Dyson & Schofield 1984, 291–2 & n 9, 310; see also Ekwall 1954, 196–7).\footnote{It is possible that Cheapside, associated with an open market area at its eastern end adjacent to the Walbrook, and topographically associated with these early sokes, could have been newly laid out in the period before Alfred’s revival. The commercial function of the soke of Ceolmundinghaga demonstrates that there was a sizeable population in the area. It can reasonably be inferred that although the wic in the Strand area to the west of the Roman walled enclave might well have been devastated and considerably reduced in the raids of AD 842 and 851, a multi-functional settlement, albeit restricted in size, is likely to have continued within the walled area and possibly in the area of the Fleet Valley to the west of the walls, and that such organisation within it, combined with the agricultural resources outside it, was sufficient to sustain the Viking over-wintering in AD 871–2. Before the grant of the soke of Ceolmundinghaga to the bishop of Worcester in AD 857, this was not only held by the prefect Coelmund but was also the place where the ‘scale and weights and measures as is customary in the port’ were kept (Whitelock 1979, 529). The situation of this important functional focus at this time within or near the early burh around St Paul’s is consistent with the creation of a new burh within the walls either in the mid-9th century, possibly as a result of the Viking raid of AD 851, or at a rather earlier period. It would have been with the occupation within}}
or around this burh that the trading activity at Queenhithe in the mid-9th century, noted above, would have been associated.

The royal palace

One significant element in the new burh of Alfred, though probably not new at the time, appears to have been a royal ‘palace’ site, about which there has been considerable discussion. This appears to have occupied a key site just to the north of St Paul’s, adjacent to the newly laid out Cheapside, and within a stone’s throw of the early folk-moot. There are grounds for suggesting that this was, from an early date, associated with the church of St Martin le Grand, whose precinct may have occupied all or part of this site (Milne 2001, 128–9; Cowie 2004, 204). Milne has drawn attention to archaeological evidence which is possibly indicative of the existence of a royal (or at least, high status) hall nearby (Milne 2001, 129). The siting of a royal palace in this area (of which the hall may have been a part), rather than at Aldermanbury, could also provide an alternative context for the location of Ceolmundinghaga, which was situated ‘by the west gate’, and which was the residence of the royal portreeve until given to the bishop of Worcester in AD 857.

The early documentation relating to the foundation of St Martin le Grand is particularly intriguing. It emerges into the light of recorded history in 1065 as a college of secular canons and a Royal Free Chapel which was founded by a royal clerk named Ingelric, who became its first dean (Honeybourne 1932–3; Denton 1970, 28–40; Davis 1972; Lobel 1989, Gazetteer; Taylor 2002). In her detailed discussion of the evidence relating to the events surrounding the formation of this college and church in the years immediately before and after the Conquest, Pamela Taylor, however, rather skirts around the questions of why the church and college came to be founded by Ingelric at this point in time, and how he came into possession of such a comparatively large tract of land so near the centre of the city, which by the 1060s was already becoming quite heavily developed. An explanation for the peculiarities of the timing, the siting and the circumstances of this event could be that the new college and the church supposedly founded in 1065 by Ingelric was a refoundation of an earlier collegiate minster church which had had particularly close royal associations, and that he had ‘obtained’ this through his close connections with the royal administration. This would have been made possible by the shift of the king’s interests to Westminster at the time. This would indeed follow the pattern shown in the cases of other Royal Free Chapels (Denton 1970). The ‘gift’ of the 12 estates to the church at this point by Ingelric (Taylor 2002, 216) would be consistent with a process of re-endowment of estates which had originally been held by the canons of the earlier minster. The grant to the new church by the king soon after in 1067 (and regranted in 1075x85) of an enormous tract of land to the north-west and west of the city, with full soke rights, between Moorfields to the east and possibly the River Fleet to the west (Taylor 2002; Haslam & Butler 2006, 45), gives an indication that the parochia of this earlier minster could have extended over most if not all of the western part of the early burh and an area outside the walls to the west. This cannot be discussed fully here, but if this is so, it is possible that this minster could have formed part of the ecclesiastical and parochial provision for the new burh of Alfred, in the same way that the New Minster at Winchester was designed to replace the parochial functions of the Old Minster at this time.\(^ {13}\)

Furthermore, the significance of this church at an even earlier date could be reflected in the tradition recorded by Matthew Paris of an association of the church of St Alban Wood Street with a putative royal palace of Offa, whose veracity Taylor supports (Taylor 2002, 220 & n 24). If the collegiate church of St Martin’s of 1065 was a refoundation of an earlier parochial minster, it is quite possible that St Alban’s Wood Street might well have been founded at this time to take over the former parochial responsibilities of the minster at St Martin’s, that its parish would have comprised at least the wards of Cripplegate and perhaps Aldersgate, and that the traditions of the earlier association of a church with a royal palace could have been transferred from St Martin’s to the new church. This would be consistent both with the archaeological evidence for the dating of St Alban’s to this period (Milne 2001, 94), as
well as the documentary evidence examined by Pamela Taylor.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{THE NEW MODEL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BURH}

This series of observations and inferences has implications for any view about the early development of the burh. The use of Queenhithe as an early trading shore, in existence from the mid-9th century and certainly operating in the early 880s as a component of the earliest layout of the burh, carries the implication that the two north–south streets to the north of Thames Street (Bread Street and Garlick Hill / Bow Lane), which were symmetrically placed to the east and west of Queenhithe (Schofield 1990, 153–5; Dyson 1992, 18), were either new developments in \textit{c.AD} 879–80 (rather than 886 or in the early 890s) or were already in existence by this time. It is likely that the streets immediately to the east and south of the earlier precinct were also part of this planned complex, since they served an obvious function in connecting the east and south gates of the precinct with the other elements of the townscape (Schofield \textit{et al} 2008–9, 84). The dating of the use of the trading foreshore to \textit{c.AD} 880 is important in underpinning the model that this complex, together with Cheapside, was a component of the reorganisation of the new burghal space of London within the walls for permanent settlement in the early 880s, of which river-borne trade from overseas, as well as from upriver, was a staple support. The charter of \textit{AD} 889 provides evidence for the existence at that date of the right of the king to tax trade both on the public streets and the trading shore, which is also apparent in the evidence from Domesday of the burh of Southwark, discussed below. A gateway in the Roman riverside wall at Queenhithe at this time would also have allowed the use of the foreshore for mooring boats shown in the charter of \textit{AD} 898 in favour of the archbishop of Canterbury’s soke to the west of Queenhithe, which, as Tony Dyson has observed, was ‘an important and restricted privilege of more than routine interest’ (Dyson 1978, 206). As such, it implies direct royal control and regulation of trading from the boats using the facility at a time which preceded these rights being granted by the king to the bishop of Worcester and to the archbishop. These would have been amongst those rights which were consolidated on the setting up of the burh, which were regulated by the king and from which he received an income (Dyson 1978, 206; Biddle 1989, 25–6; Dyson 1990, 102). It is very likely, too, that the rights and privileges given by the king in \textit{AD} 889 and 898 regarding the use of the soke by the bishop and archbishop would have entailed the responsibility for the repair, and possibly also the garrisoning, of the adjoining Roman riverside wall, as well as the gate(s) which gave them access to the foreshore.

The importance of the association of the main streets leading from the river to the interior of the town with early harbours or trading areas is one of the characteristic features of the early layout of the townscape of London which has been emphasised by all commentators on the early topography of the town (Schofield 1990, 153–5; Dyson 1992b; Steedman \textit{et al} 1992, 11; Keene 1990, 178–9; Keene 2003, 245). Tony Dyson points to the fact that the ‘apparent prototypes’ of this situation at Bread Street, Dowgate Hill, Botolph Lane and St Mary’s Hill ‘widened out south of Thames Street to form spacious open areas at the heads of Queenhithe, Dowgate, Botolph Wharf and Billingsgate’. Another instance could well be the association of Garlick Hill / Bow Lane with an early hithe at Garlickhithe to the east of Queenhithe. Furthermore, each of these harbours, apart from Dowgate, enjoyed a ‘special and apparently exclusive role as “common quays” open to all shipping’, and they shared the same legal status as part of the public highway (Dyson 1992b, 124) — on which trading activity in the 880s was demonstrably the preserve of the king. It would have been appropriate to the proper functioning of the burh as a securely-defended enclosure for gates to have been constructed in the Roman riverside wall at these points, if they were not (as at Queenhithe) already in existence. These would have served not only as necessary connections from the foreshore to the interior, but also as points of restricted access which would have allowed the king’s agents control of movement to facilitate the collection of taxes.\textsuperscript{15}
Tony Dyson has, however, argued that a pattern of consecutive development of these streets is shown in the development of wharves at Queenhithe in the late 9th century, Billingsgate in the mid to late 10th century, and Dowgate in the mid-11th century, and that this shows that the street pattern developed in different parts of the city in a piecemeal fashion over a long period. This gradualist view seems to have an echo in Lyn Blackmore's picture of the street pattern 'emerging' from the late 880s (Blackmore 1997, 130), and in earlier views about the development of intramural London from west to east. Reasons have already been given, however, for holding that the evidence for the development of the Billingsgate area is more consistent with a late 9th-century date. There seems no reason to hold that the development of the wharf at Dowgate, on a topographically significant area next to the mouth of the Walbrook, only began with the association of French and German merchants with it from the mid-11th century (Dyson 1992b, 129–30). This is evidence of the date of its use, not of its origin, and the topographical indications of the relative antiquity of the street — its uninterrupted course from the Thames to Lombard Street along the east side of the Walbrook valley — are more consistent with the street and the hithes being established as elements in the layout of the new burghal space at the same time as those at Queenhithe and Billingsgate as public hithes, than its later addition to an urban landscape which had already taken shape. This is also consistent with the fact that the rights over trading at Dowgate given to the foreign merchants by Edward the Confessor in the mid-11th century (Dyson 1992b, 129) show that before this time these rights were in the gift of the king, and therefore likely to be the direct successors of those rights of King Alfred by which he was able to tax trading both in the streets and on the foreshore.

There is therefore a strong evidential basis for putting forward a new model of the development of the burgh of London, by suggesting that this group of streets (Bread Street, Garlick Hill, Dowgate Hill, Fish Street Hill, Botolph Lane and St Mary's Hill) — all of which show a common topographical characteristic in running in unbroken lines from early hithes on the river to connect with major east-west routes and/or markets in the centre of the town, and all of which are primary in terms of their archaeological or topographical characteristics (or both) — comprised elements in a unified plan for the whole of the burgh of London within the walls which was laid out at one period of time. Fish Street Hill, moreover, in leading from the bridge over the river, is likely to have been a key spinal street which has survived in continuous use from the mid-Saxon period if not earlier. This fundamental concept — familiar as a result of work over the last few decades at Winchester, amongst other places (Biddle & Hill 1971; Biddle 1978) — addresses the inherent inconsistencies in the notion that these elements 'developed' or 'emerged', with no apparent causal agency.

Furthermore, it can be reasonably argued that both the spatial and functional attributes shown in the inter-relationships of all these different elements demonstrate that these streets, and the hithes or wharves with which they were associated, were essential components of a larger integrated system of streets and routes, which related to the pre-existing framework of the Roman walls and gates and the position of the bridge, as well as to the precinct of St Paul's. It is this aspect which is so prominently absent from the model proposed by Gustav Milne, discussed above. This system — for such it appears to be — also included a realigned major spinal street at Cheapside/Poultry, which acted as an internal market, leading to an expanded market area and, at its eastern end, a bridge over the Walbrook. (This seems to have been a parallel to the suggested open market area at Eastcheap, at the eastern end of the planned unit centred along Cannon Street.)

The formalisation of the routeways between this point and the gates in the Roman wall in the east and north-east part of the intramural space would be expected, in that they would have provided access to this market from all quarters. The system would also have included two subsidiary east-west routeways to the west of Walbrook and to the south of Cheapside, which were merged at their eastern ends at the stream. Its direct continuation eastwards as a single route was also clearly developed as another kind of planned unit along Cannon Street (Candlewick Street).
The archaeological evidence for the early date of Miles Lane, and the evidence of the position and topographical relationships of this plan unit as a whole (of which Miles Lane is a component), show that this too is likely to have been a primary element in the overall layout. As argued in detail below, an important part of this system would have been the bridge over the Thames and the street leading from it, the latter of which has been dated archaeologically to the earliest phase of the intramural layout.

The underlying premise for this model is that in both their functional and spatial aspects the existence and the layout of the individual elements in this system make sense only insofar as they relate to the complementary functional and spatial attributes of all the others. The best explanation for these patterns and inter-relationships is that these elements were set out as inter-related components of a single multi-functional system, which was conceived as an integrated and organic whole. It can be inferred that this system, as a spatial and functional unity, is therefore the expression of a single episode of urban creation, and that it involved the realisation on the ground of a formal plan for the ‘restoration’ of the burh of London, which was intended to accommodate and implement the functions of defence, settlement and trade, as well as other religious, social and jurisdicational aspects. The most appropriate historical context for the origin of this system is arguably that it was the direct outcome of the burh-building initiative of King Alfred in AD 879–80. This appears to be directly validated by the evidence of the London Monogram coins which were used and dropped in the early 880s on the shore at Bull Wharf at Queenhithe. Since this trading shore was a vital functional component in the system as a whole, this evidence can be taken as indicating that this system was put in place at this time, and provides crucial support for the validity of the general model.

This overall model directly associates the aspects of the burh as both an institution and as a newly organised physical space, both of which were developed as a means whereby the king could exercise the closest control over not only the needs of defence and the security of the kingdom but also a variety of income-generating resources, and of economic development in general; important amongst these taxable resources would have been mooring rights and trading on the foreshore, trading on the public streets as markets, and the income from coin production. It reinforces similar conclusions which can be drawn from the charter setting out the various rights pertaining to the caddorman and the bishop in the formation of the burh at Worcester of a slightly later date (Tait 1936, 20–2; Dyson 1978, 211; Dyson 1990, 99; Dyson 1992a; Brooks 1996, 143–4). It also reflects the close conjunction of the economic concerns of the king with the setting up of the burghal system of Wessex, pointed out more than 50 years ago by Martin Biddle and David Hill (Biddle & Hill 1971, 83), and which has been discussed more recently for instance by Nicholas Brooks (Brooks 1996, 143–4; Brooks 2003, 158–62). While many of these functions would also have been shown by 7th- to 9th-century Lundemwic to the west of the Roman walled town (eg Biddle 1989, 23–6; Dyson 1992a, 15; Cowie 2000; Cowie 2001; Keene 2003), their concentration within the new burghal space would have meant that the other functions of defence and the provision of a garrison and army would be directly underpinned by the resources — both human and economic — made available to the king from these activities, and by the responsibilities of the burh inhabitants which came with their privileges as protected citizens. The military responsibilities of the newly conscripted inhabitants of the burhs, the burhward, were facilitated by the economic interests and other benefits which this new situation gave them (Brooks 2003, 161–2) — a not unimportant aspect of which would have been new opportunities for social mobility and advancement. The evidence of the London Monogram coins from Bull Wharf also carries a greater weight, since this not only validates the overall model outlined in this paper for the development of London as a burh in AD 879–80, but also in turn supports the wider model for the development of the system of burhs in Wessex and eastern Mercia in the short period prior to this, and, by implication (in arguments presented elsewhere, see Haslam 2005), the dating of the Burghal Hidaye to the years AD 878–9.
This model can be extended by a consideration of the origin of the wards, which the writer has suggested represented the basic means by which the population of the new burh was organised on a territorial basis for the performance of public obligations for defence and other duties, and that they therefore represent one of the basic topographical and functional elements of the new burh (Haslam 1988). This concept has been taken up by Milne, who infers that a basic number of ten wards in his core area, created in c. AD 900, was expanded by the addition of other peripheral wards as development proceeded outside this core area (Milne 2001, 130 fig 145). However, given Milne’s own suggestion that the wards originated to facilitate the defence of the burh, it is difficult to see how the ‘outer’ wards could be secondary to those in the primary core, since most of the former encircle the gates and include extramural areas as well as lengths of wall on either side of these gates. Furthermore, Milne’s inference concerning the late insertion of Bridge ward around Fish Street Hill to the north of the bridge, ‘which seems to carve or extend its boundaries out of earlier wards on all sides’ (Milne 2001, 129), is predicated on the assumption that the bridge was first built in the late 10th century (discussed further below). It could be argued, however, that the interlocking pattern of wards to the east of the Walbrook and their focus along the main thoroughfares discussed above (in particular Langbourne, Bridge, Cornhill, Bishopsgate, and Lime Street wards), is significant evidence for the primary importance of these routeways in the early townscape of the new burh. It is probable, moreover, that the northern part of Bridge ward had originally formed part of the bishop of London’s soke, discussed above. This pattern is also consistent with the arguments given above that all the intramural area of the burh was from the beginning organised (though not necessarily fully occupied) for settlement and defence in one operation, rather than that blank spaces with open fields outside this supposed core area were gradually developed as the population expanded. That the three wards of Aldersgate, Cripplegate and Farringdon (Within and Without) encircle the four gates of the western part of the burh seems to be a direct mirror of the pattern in the east, where Bishopsgate, Aldgate and Tower Wards (the latter including the precincts of the Tower and a large extramural area) lap around the three gates of the pre-Conquest burh (Brooke & Keir 1975, 151–3, map; Haslam 1988, 37 fig 8). Many of the wards in other Domesday boroughs, such as Cambridge, Stamford, Huntingdon, York and Wallingford, lapped around the principal gates of their respective boroughs (where they can be identified), and have been seen as resulting from the original need to organise the new burghal spaces for defence and other public obligations (Roffe 2007, 135–6).16

**THE QUEENHITHE SOKE OF THE BISHOP OF WORCESTER IN AD 889**

There are aspects of the charter of AD 889 (Dyson 1978) which throw some light onto these mechanisms of burghal formation by the king, which have hitherto not been fully brought out. It is suggested here that the granting to the bishop of Worcester of the soke or haga at Queenhithe, at a prime location adjacent to the principal trading shore and at a comparatively early date in the setting up of the burh, was essentially motivated by one major factor — the trade in salt. John Maddicot has recently added evidence to show that the church at Worcester had considerable interests in salt manufacture at Droitwich, as well as in its trade and supply over a wide area of Mercia from probably the late 7th century (Maddicot 2005). The existence of grants of property and trading privileges in the form of the remission of tolls on two ships at the port to the church of Worcester in the wic at London in the early 8th century (Kelly 1992, 12, 15), together with the distribution of coinage in Mercia from a London mint, are indicators both of a trading network in salt between Droitwich and a terminus in London (which included a transhipment point on the Thames at Lechlade), and of the early involvement of the church at Worcester as both the agent and the beneficiary of this distribution (Maddicot 2005, 44–5). The grant of another property in London at Ceolmundinghaga to the church in AD 857 by Burged (Whitecock 1979, 529), mentioned above, is likely to have marked, as Susan Kelly
suggests, ‘the transfer within the walls of an existing Worcester immunity in the Strand settlement’ (Kelly 1992, 12). It is therefore most likely to represent a continuation of the bishop’s connection with the trade in salt, which, if so, is an indication of the continued demand for this commodity in the region even after the devastating Viking raids of the mid-9th century.

The association of the trade in salt with Worcester is also shown in the charter describing the setting up of the new market and burh at Worcester in the early 890s, in which salt is mentioned as being one of the key commodities on which tolls were to remain the exclusive right of the king (Maddicott 2005). The implication of this is that the products of the saltworks at Droitwich (owned by that time by both the king and the bishop, amongst others) were taken to Worcester as a transhipment point for onward movement either down the Severn or along land routes which eventually led to London via the Thames, and that the sale of salt in the new burghal market would not be allowed to diminish the king’s customary income from tolls and taxes on this trade. It can hardly be fortuitous that in AD 889, only a little before the date of charter,¹⁸ the bishop of Worcester is given a valuable soke in London by King Alfred and Aethelred with exclusive marketing privileges, which was situated right next to the foreshore trading area and with ready access via an existing street system to the main market at Cheapside. The apparent continuity of the bishop’s interests in trading in London from the early 8th century through the mid-9th century shows that this grant is not likely to have been merely the result of a personal gift by the king to one of his favourite helpers — though this might well have facilitated the whole deal. Since his assumption of control of Mercia in late AD 879, King Alfred must have become aware of the huge commercial — and indeed social and economic — value of the Droitwich salt industry, in which the Mercian kings had had well-established rights of both manufacturing and as a source of taxable income for the previous two centuries. King Alfred kept these rights for himself rather than allowing a share to Aethelred (Maddicott 2005, 42). It must be concluded that the bishop’s soke in London was established by the king, in some sort of partnership deal with Aethelred and the bishop, to facilitate and ensure the supply of what must have been a crucially important commodity to the general economy of the burh. The salt would, for instance, have been used in the preservation of fish, making viable an industry which has been identified as being of primary importance to the economy of London at this and earlier periods (Milne 1999, 146–7), as well as being vital for the production of butter and cheese, for the preservation of meat, and in tanning.

Furthermore, the charter recording the acquisition of a plot of land in London by the bishop of Worcester in AD 857 mentions the payment of 60 shillings by the bishop to King Burgred for the trading immunity within the soke (Kelly 1992, 12), and the payment of 12 pence a year for rent. This carries the implication not only that this transaction had a commercial origin but also that the acquisition by the bishop of the very similar trading immunity in the soke at Queenhithe in AD 889 would have involved a payment to the king. Alfred is therefore likely to have directly benefited from this grant, not only through this down-payment, but also in the on-going revenue stream through tolls and taxes on both manufacture and distribution which this trade in salt would have brought him, as much as it would have benefited the bishop through its direct sale in London and probable onward trading to Kent and the Continent. By remitting his income from tolls in the ‘tax-free zone’ within the bishop’s soke (but not, significantly, at the market in Worcester), King Alfred would not only have increased demand, but would also have correspondingly enhanced his own income from the tolls and taxes levied elsewhere, both on its production and at points along the distribution network. And by forgoing taxes on the foreshore in the later grant to the bishop in AD 898 (as well as to the archbishop of Canterbury), which were apparently still levied in the grant of AD 889, the king seems to have consolidated this economic strategy. This grant therefore provides one of the best exemplars of the close connections between the king’s need to augment and expand his income base, and of his utilisation of the opportunities to achieve this through partnerships in the
development of the burghal institution at London (as in other burhs), to the end of the creation of a viable and sustainable community which was geared to the needs of the defence of the kingdom.

This policy of implementing partnership ‘deals’ between key players in these processes is further emphasised in the acquisition in AD 904 of a lease by Aethelred, Aethelflaed and their daughter of an estate near Worcester, owned by the bishop, of which an appurtenant property was a large haga in Worcester (Sawyer 1968, no. 1280; Bailey 2001, 117–18). The dimensions of this haga given in the charter show it to have lain along the waterfront of the River Severn in between the cathedral and the northern defences of the new burh of the late 880s. Recent work on the early development of Worcester has shown that this forms a contrasting topographical unit with the planned High Street, and was separated from the bridge by an extramural market area (Baker & Slater 1992; Baker et al 1992, 73; Holt 2005, 127; Baker & Holt 2004, 174–8). The implication of this is that this haga was created in the initial stage of the setting up of the burh — perhaps forming a privileged trading area on the waterfront which was part of the bishop’s ‘share’ in the division of the new burghal space described in the charter concerning the setting up of the burh. The parallels between the existence of this large haga in Worcester and the creation in AD 889 of another haga in London, also on the waterfront adjacent to the primary hithc of the burh and also made available for privileged use by the same bishop, are particularly striking. Archaeological evidence has suggested that this haga in Worcester is likely to have been used as a trading area at least from the 8th century (Baker & Slater 1992; Baker et al 1992, 72) — one important component of which would very probably have been the trade in salt.

It might on the face of it seem decidedly unusual for the ealdorman of all the Mercians to want to take on a lease of a considerable chunk of intramural Worcester when he already possessed a half share in all its assets (although this might well have been instigated by Aethelflaed for the eventual benefit of their daughter Aelfwine). Furthermore, if the bishop had been so minded he could merely have leased the extramural estate and kept the attached intramural haga in his own hands. It is possible therefore that this transaction of AD 904, which gave the ealdorman of Mercia and his first lady control over what must have been a commercial gold-mine, could have been a direct quid pro quo for the benefits which had been given to the bishop by Alfred and Aethelred in the grant of AD 889 in London. If this is so, it demonstrates not only, as Maggie Bailey has suggested, ‘close working relationships, both commercial and military, between rulers and the church’ (Bailey 2001, 118), but perhaps more importantly how partnership agreements between the founders of the burhs and other key players facilitated and indeed became an essential part of the way in which the overall strategic and economic aims of the state were implemented.

THE BURH OF SOUTHWARK AND LONDON BRIDGE

The creation of a burh at Southwark as part of the system put in place by King Alfred in Wessex and eastern Mercia, arguably in the years AD 878–9, and the creation of a bridge between it and the new burh at London, may also be considered — in spite of a range of contrary and contradictory opinion which is discussed below — as being key factors both in the overall organisation of the new burghal space of the early 880s discussed above, and in the strategic equation of the time. It is therefore important to include a discussion of these factors here. The number of hides assigned to the burh at Southwark in the Burghal Hidage is comparable to others on the northern frontier of Wessex with Mercia. The eight burhs in the Burghal Hidage on this border and in eastern Mercia (Southwark, Sashes, Wallingford, Oxford, Buckingham, Cricklade, Malmsbury and Bath) between them account for nearly half the number of hides available for the system as a whole (Haslam 2005, 131). The 1,800 hides given to Southwark therefore represent a larger proportion of the total than the average, and are equal to the total due from the shire of Surrey in Domesday. Clearly, in the context of the creation of this system of burhs, the border between Wessex and Mercia was seen as a key strategic area to which a relatively high proportion of the
manpower resources of Wessex was directed. Furthermore, the only burhs in the Burghal Hidage which were supplied with more hides (and therefore men) than the perimeter of their defences required, according to the formula appended to version A, are Bath, Wallingford and probably also Southwark, all of them situated on this border. These considerations are a major supporting argument for the hypothesis of the creation of the burghal system in the context of the control of Mercia by the Viking Guthrum in the period AD 878–9, when his army was in occupation with its base at Cirencester and — as argued in detail elsewhere — the Vikings were in occupation of London with an army stationed to its west at Fulham (Haslam 2005; Haslam forthcoming a).21

Leaving aside the uncertainties attendant on the determination of the layout of the burh at Southwark (Hill 1996b, 218–19),22 it is important to reiterate the general principle that the size of a burh bears no necessary relationship to its hidage, though approximate equivalences do exist. There is a wide variation in the relationship between the lengths of the defences of the 30 burhs in the Burghal Hidage and the number of hides assigned to them (Brooks 1996, 129–32; Brooks 2003, 158 n 19; Haslam 2005, 146–7; Haslam 2009, 111–14). Therefore, it is argued that there can be absolutely no value in attempting to predict the length of a burh’s defences from the number of hides assigned to it by application of the formula in the document, as has been generally assumed (Haslam 2009, 111–14). Attempts to do this at Southwark, where the layout of the Saxon burh is not obviously apparent from the later urban topography, would therefore be entirely unhelpful. Nevertheless, the 1,800 hides given to Southwark is smaller than the number given to Winchester and Wallingford but larger than, for instance, the number given to the large rectilinear burhs of Cricklade, Wareham and Oxford, as well as the large Roman towns of Chichestter and Exeter (Hill 1996a, 78). The concentration of the manpower resources of the shire at this burh, which is directly indicated by the Burghal Hidage name-form,23 implies that it clearly had a role of particular significance in the strategic intentions of the original system of which it was a component.

In considering the significance of its early name-form in the Burghal Hidage, Dyson has suggested that the burh at Southwark (and by implication all other burhs included in the document) was ‘a paper expression, better befitting a blue-print than a completed programme, and in effect earmarking a projected burh on a hitherto unnamed site whose future responsibility was to be the responsibility of the men of Surrey’ (Dyson 1990, 110 n 57). As will be seen, Dyson’s inference from this concerning ‘... the failure of Alfred’s plans to rebuild the bridge ... and to establish a fortress at Southwark to protect its further end’ has projected an altogether agnostic cast on recent views on the question of the existence of a bridge over the river in Alfred’s time.24 The writer has, however, argued that the fortresses or burhs in the system described in the Burghal Hidage (including those at Oxford and Buckingham north of the Thames) were indeed planned and built as a system at one short period in time (in the period AD 878–9). One of the many reasons for accepting that this plan was realised on the ground is the fact that most of the burhs comprising this system can be inspected in the field (Hill 1996b; Haslam 2005). It can reasonably be inferred — insofar as any strategic intention can be inferred from later outcomes — that the building of the system as a whole achieved one of its aims in causing the strategic withdrawal of Viking forces at Cirencester to East Anglia, and the retreat of the Viking army upstream at Fulham back to Frankia (Haslam 2005, 124–7). As the writer has argued, one of the immediate objectives of the burh at Southwark would have been to challenge both the Viking army at Fulham as well as the Vikings in occupation of the City, and to make sure that a similar incursion up the Thames would not happen again (Haslam 2005, 130). Its creation on the opposite side of the river to London, which it is argued was held by the Vikings from AD 877–9, would also have served notice to its occupiers that their continued presence in the Roman walled area was anything but secure. It can be argued therefore that the formation of the garrisoned burh at Southwark was one of the proximate causes of the retreat of Guthrum’s forces to the east of the River Lea and their abandonment of control of
London, evidenced in Alfred and Guthrum's treaty, to leave London on the north bank in the control of Alfred. It can be inferred therefore that it was indeed built, that it was a new fortification at the time, that the 1,800 men from Surrey were mobilised to construct and garrison it, and that it represented at the time a highly effective instrument of both defence and offence.

This model of the origin and development of Southwark is not only at variance with Dyson's inference that it did not exist; it also challenges the contrary view of Martha Carlin, who suggests that Southwark owes its origin not to Alfred's burh-building programme but to a phase of fortification as a 'bridgehead' at an earlier period, most probably the early 9th century (Carlin 1996, 12). She views Southwark at the time of its inclusion in the Burghal Hidage as 'a fortification with little or no population'. There are, however, a number of aspects of the Domesday account of Southwark which can be interpreted as being survivals, and therefore indicators, of attributes given to it in the initial stages of the setting up of the burh by Alfred. These include its unmanorialised state, the king's rights (of which the earl had the third penny, *i.e.* a one third share) to the tolls of moorings *in strande* (on the shore) and *in vico Aquae* (the docks or hithes or, equally probably, the streets and markets of the settlement) and to the profits of justice, his interests in the minster, the evidence of the presence of a toll-house of the king which accounted to the royal manor of Kingston for its receipts, and its tenurial heterogeneity (Carlin 1996, 15–18). In view of the fact that these tolls on moorings and *in vico* are exactly parallel to the tolls taken by the king on the *ripa emportalis* (the trading shore) and in the streets which are mentioned in the charters of AD 889 and 898 relating to sokes at Queenhithe, discussed above, it seems highly probable that these Domesday attributes from Southwark were a survival from the time of the foundation of the burh by the king as a garrisoned fortress and as a permanent settlement, occupied by a population from which he was able to exact tolls and taxes from the start.

This overall view of Southwark as a fortified, garrisoned, organised and populated settlement (as good a minimal definition of a late Saxon urban burh as any) created by King Alfred, arguably in the period AD 878–9, has an important bearing on the question of the origins of London Bridge. Though some doubt has been cast on the existence of a bridge before the end of the 10th century, as will be discussed below, there are several considerations which should dispel any reasonable doubt that a bridge would have been constructed or reconstructed by Alfred on the occasion of the creation of the burh at London to connect it with the 'Surreymen's fortification' at Southwark, which had been put in place only perhaps a year or so before. A defining feature of most of the burhs of Wessex and Mercia of the late 9th and early 10th centuries was that they were almost invariably linked with bridges which played a defensive role. Brooks pointed out that from the 8th century, '... in England bridges were linked with fortresses ... Bridge and fortress were a single military unit; together they secured the river crossing for the armies of the kingdom and together they prevented the movement of enemy troops either by land or by river' (Brooks 1971, 72). The use of the strategy of the deployment of a bridge over a river linking two fortresses in establishing an effective counter to the movement of Viking ships along major rivers was used by Charlemagne in the 780s (Cooper 2006), probably Offa in the later 8th century (Haslam 1987a), Charles the Bald in Francia in the 860s and 870s (Hassall & Hill 1970; Abels 1988, 72; Gilmour 1989; Smyth 1995, 138–45; Cooper 2006), and is, for instance, demonstrated by the entry in the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* for AD 895, in which Alfred's rout of the Vikings by the use of these tactics at a burh north of London is described (Abels 1988, 73). Richard Abels has also pointed out that the burhs were designed to operate with the reformed *fyrd*, Alfred's mobile field army, in such a way that the associated bridges not only blocked access to rivers by the Vikings but also gave the *fyrd* the mobility they required to carry out their function (Abels 1988, 63–8, 71). This close functional (and therefore physical) association of burhs and bridges is also shown in the fact that boroughwork and bridgework are seen as a joint service in a number of 10th-century charters (Brooks 1996, 142 & n 53). This model of the burh as forming a military unit linked with a bridge
has also been applied in examining a possible system of such burhs in Mercia in the reign of Offa in the late 8th century (Haslam 1987a), and to the siting and layout of new burhs in Devon at Barnstaple, Totnes and Kingsbridge (amongst other places), which were arguably replacements in the later 9th century for small forts set up in the initial system described in the Burghal Hidage at Pilton and Halwell respectively (Haslam 1984a). The layouts of other burhs associated with bridges in Mercia have also been discussed at Bedford (Haslam 1983), Cambridge (Haslam 1984b), and Nottingham (Haslam 1987b).

In the face of these parallels, which indicate a ubiquitous practice on both sides of the Channel in the 9th century and earlier as well as in early 10th-century Mercia, and in consideration of Alfred’s documented use of these tactics himself in AD 895, it cannot be reasonably argued that Alfred would not have taken immediate steps to secure the defence of his burhs both at Southwark and at London with a bridge connecting them. As discussed above, its function would have been to guard against further Viking incursions up the Thames. From late AD 879 the Thames was no longer a boundary between two separate kingdoms but a highway leading into the heart of the combined area covered by a single polity and controlled by the same king. The bridge would also have been a crucial element in the movement of armies and levies from one side of the river to the other, especially since at the time the presence of the new Scandinavian state in East Anglia would have required the forces from Surrey and Kent to have been available north of the river, just as those from Middlesex and London were probably available to come to the rescue of the garrison at Rochester in AD 885. While there is neither documentary nor archaeological evidence for London Bridge at this period, to postulate its absence would be to ignore not only the strategic imperatives which created defensive bridges associated with burhs shown in the variety of sources and situations of the 9th century, but also the particular strategic importance of London at the lowest bridging point of the Thames in the late Saxon period. Both of these factors must have been at the forefront of the strategic thinking of King Alfred and his advisors at this juncture.

This needs to be emphasised in view of the apparent prevalence of what can only be described as a climate of denial over this issue in recent writings on the early development of London Bridge. Although the received view of the origin of the bridge and the burh at Southwark is that it was constructed or reconstructed on the occasion of the ‘restoration’ of London in AD 886 (Biddle & Hudson 1973, 23; Dyson & Schofield 1984, 299; Keynes 1998, 23–4; Keene 2000, 144; Keene 2003, 243) — which view accepts the importance of bridges as instruments of the defence of rivers against shipborne Viking armies — an altogether different and revisionist view is taken by both Bruce Watson and Gustav Milne in a number of publications. In 2001 Watson aptly observed that, ‘Where a bridge existed, Southwark would have become a fortified bridgehead and a vital part of London’s defences, whereas in the absence of one it could have been little more than a cul-de-sac surrounded by creeks and marshes’ (Watson 2001a, 53; cf. Dyson 1990, n 57). Following Dyson’s views on the non-existence of a burh at Southwark, and relying heavily on the absence of both archaeological and documentary evidence of a bridge before the late 10th century, Watson draws the conclusion that the bridge itself would not have existed in the late 9th or 10th centuries, and that it would have been first built as a result of the Viking raids of AD 994 (Watson & Dyson 1997, 313; Watson 1999, 17; Watson 2001a, 53; Watson 2004, 19–20; Brown 2008) — in spite of referring more or less extensively in all these publications to the evidence of the ubiquitous practice of the strategic use of defensive bridges in Frankia and England in the 9th and 10th centuries referred to above. The premise of the absence of a bridge in the 9th and 10th centuries, and its creation in around 1000, is also used by Milne as one basis for a model for the development of the port of London in the medieval period (Milne 1999, 150–1), and in particular in his subsequent development of this model (Milne 2001, 130). This seems to have become an established (but in the writer’s view untenable) paradigm amongst those working in London (see for instance Hagland & Watson 2005, 328; Brown 2008).

Watson’s model is developed further by reference to the archaeological evidence on
the north bank, citing evidence of occupation from the early 11th century onwards along the line of Gracechurch Street / Bishopsgate, the main route (with Fish Street Hill) from the bridgehead northwards through the early town. He goes on to argue that this is ‘consistent with the likelihood that Gracechurch Street and Bishopsgate Street were laid out at the turn of the 10th and 11th centuries to provide good communications with the port established at the northern bridgehead [at Billingsgate / New Fresh Wharf] as part of a large-scale development which may well have included the restoration of the bridge itself’ (Watson 2001a, 55). This view is, however, unsustainable, for two main reasons. Firstly, the presence of archaeological evidence of occupation alongside a street dates only its use, not its origin. Secondly, there is good archaeological evidence (described above) to show that both Fish Street Hill and Botolph Lane to its east are at least as early as the late 9th century. Gracechurch Street and Bishopsgate Street are its continuation, forming a topographical and functional unity with it in connecting the bridge to one of the principal gates at Bishopsgate, and are therefore as early. None of these streets would, therefore, have originated with the hypothesised late 10th-century development — for which the only basis is the dating of the earliest identifiable docks to the east of the bridge to this period. Since there is no obvious or direct functional relationship between the formation of these docks and the existence, or new creation, of the bridge, there is no basis for postulating their contemporaneity. These inconsistencies in Watson’s views are highlighted by his further observation that the ‘survival of both the northern and southern [Roman] approach roads to London bridge suggests that the roads remained in use throughout the early and middle Saxon periods, perhaps encouraged, in the absence of a bridge at this period, by the existence of some sort of river ferry’ (Watson 2001a, 55–6). Milne also states ‘that the Alfredian town boasted no fixed link with the Surrey shore, but was content to be served by ferries’ (Milne 2001, 129). It should be clear, firstly, that the idea of the long-term survival of the alignment of the routeway from bridgehead to Bishopsgate in the Saxon town north of the river, which follows in part the alignment of a Roman route which must have had an equivalent function, is not compatible with the model of the new development of these streets in the late 10th / early 11th centuries. Secondly, it is highly improbable that the survival of the alignment of the Roman roads leading to the southern as well as the northern bridgehead, which were fixed in position, can be explained by the operation of a moveable and transitory ferry — although a ferry would have been available at times when the structure of the bridge was broken, as at Rochester (Brooks 1994, 34) — for whose maintenance there would have been no support from public resources or general obligations, as with a bridge.

In short, the model for the development of London Bridge in the late 10th century which is developed by both Watson and Milne is based on a questionable methodological principle — that the origin of a phenomenon is no earlier than the earliest relevant archaeological or documentary evidence. It is also based on inferences from four areas of evidence which are unsupportable. First, the hypothesis of the absence of bridgehead fortifications at Southwark in the late 9th century (and therefore the bridge) is unsustainable; second, the absence of both archaeological and documentary evidence for the existence of the bridge before the late 10th century has no evidential force or value in demonstrating that it did not exist; third, the idea of the bridgehead to the north being an integral part of a new development in the late 10th century is made untenable by the clear archaeological and topographical evidence that the area, including Fish Street Hill, was in fact developed in the late 9th century if not earlier; and fourth, the evidence from the coincidence of alignment of the bridgehead route on both banks of the river in the Roman, Saxon and medieval streets is in itself strong evidence for the survival of the bridge from the Roman into the late Saxon period.

This discussion has, however, highlighted the issue as to whether the bridge originated as a new structure with Alfred’s restoration of intramural London as a burh in AD 879–80 argued in this paper. As Watson has pointed out, the position of a burh at Southwark, placed as it was at the river end of an
important approach road of Roman origin from the south to London on the north bank, would have made neither strategic nor tactical sense without a bridge over the river which it would have controlled. But at the time of its construction the other end of this bridge would have been directly controlled by the Vikings on the north bank, and those responsible for the construction of the burh at Southwark would have had no means of knowing for how long this situation would prevail. In view of the existence of the potentially hostile forces on the other end of the bridge, it seems doubtful therefore whether the burh builders at Southwark would have embarked on the construction of a new bridge.

A solution to this dilemma would be to suggest that there had in fact been a bridge across the Thames in its later (pre-12th-century) position for some time previously, and that the control of the southern approach to this bridge, at the lowest crossing place of the river, would have been one of Alfred's prime strategic objectives. To deny the existence of both the burh and the bridge, as have Watson, Dyson and Brown, is to ignore not only the strategic realities of the time, but also the evidence of the continued use of the Roman routeways leading to both ends of the bridge and the early existence of Fish Street Hill demonstrated from the archaeological evidence. The suggested Viking occupation of London in AD 877 would therefore have been the kind of direct threat to Alfred’s Wessex, on the other end of this bridge, which must have been a major factor in precipitating countermeasures in the form of the construction of the burh at Southwark with its large hidage assessment and garrison. In a similar way the threat of the Viking army on the Thames at Fulham in AD 878–9, in command of the river upstream as well as of the Roman Stane Street leading into Wessex via a crossing of the Thames at Staines, would have had the same galvanising effect on Alfred’s strategic thinking as would Guthrum’s occupation in AD 878–9 of Cirencester, which commanded Roman roads leading directly into Wessex. Similar issues are raised by the creation of a burh associated with a bridge at, for instance, Cricklade, where the associated bridge over the Thames would have led directly into enemy-held territory along Ermin Street to Cirencester, which was only 6.5 miles (10.4km) away. These factors have been discussed at length by the writer (Haslam 2005, 130).26

It can also be inferred from these strategic considerations that the bridge leading from the Viking-occupied town of AD 877 on the north bank of the river to hostile West Saxon territory on the south (ie before the construction of the burh at Southwark) would likewise not have been a new creation at the time. There must therefore have been a bridge over the river during the time of Alfred's control of London in the period AD 874–7, which would have facilitated communication between the parts of his kingdom on either side of the river. If this is so, there is again no reason to believe that this would have been new at the time. The construction and repair of bridges was a matter of public obligation for nearly a century before this (Brooks 1971, 80–1), and bridges were arguably a feature of the landscape from at least the end of the 8th century. Neither the control of Kent and London by King Offa of Mercia in the later 8th century, for instance, nor the occupation of London by the West Saxon king Ecberht in AD 829 — an event marked by the celebratory issue of coins minted at the London mint — would have made strategic sense if there had not been a bridge over the Thames at London to connect the two parts of their respective kingdoms.

While such examples could be multiplied, it would be more appropriate to the particular strategic implications of London's unique position, with its undoubted political significance, to postulate the existence of a bridge over the Thames from at least the time of Offa in the late 8th century, than to deny that one existed at all. To suggest that during the time of the development of the wic to the west of London from the 7th century the bridge would not be needed, and therefore did not exist (Watson & Dyson 1997, 312; Keene 2000, 143), is quite simply to miss the point — though the river may well have been fordable upstream of the bridge before the massive rise in sea levels in the later Saxon period. These arguments support the considered conclusions of Martha Carlin, who has also argued for
the existence of the bridge from at least the early or mid-9th century, and that its construction and maintenance could be seen in the context of the political developments between the Mercians and the West Saxons from this period (Carlin 1996, 11–12). It may well have been the case — as the excavated evidence for the late Saxon bridge has shown — that the physical structure of the bridge and the adjoining river banks may not have been particularly steadfast against tides, floods, rising sea and river levels and natural decay (Watson & Dyson 1997; Watson 2001c). But a bridge built on already existing Roman foundations, as at Rochester (Brooks 1993; Brooks 1994; Carlin 1996, 11; Brigham 2001, 51), would have had a certain stability before the main marine transgression in the South-East and East of England began to have an increasingly marked effect from the late Saxon period (Wilcox 1975; Everard 1975; Haslam 1990, 43–4; Brigham 2001, 25–7). The construction of the medieval stone bridge on an alignment which was about 30m east (downstream) of the Roman bridge (Watson 2001a) carries the implication that the Saxon bridge would have been on the same alignment as the Roman bridge and would have used its piers. The archaeological evidence of the existence of five phases of bridge building on the site of the south abutment of the 12th-century stone bridge, and which date from c.1000 to c.1160, is consistent with the rebuilding of the earlier (11th-century) Saxon bridge on a slightly different position as a result of the destruction of the old bridge in the 990s (Hagland & Watson 2005; Brown 2008, 56–7; Watson 2009, 148–9), and that this was then replaced by the stone bridge. This process then presupposes that the piers and starlings of the Roman and older Saxon bridge were then removed, possibly on completion of the new Saxon bridge of c.1000, to facilitate the movement of boats up and down the river. This would explain and put in context not only the observed erosion of the river banks but also the paucity of the physical and archaeological evidence for the existence of the older structure.

The example of the bridge at Rochester has a strong bearing on these conclusions, since there are many instructive parallels between the physical and geographical aspects and the historical contexts of the bridges at Rochester and London. Brooks has determined that the Saxon bridge at Rochester would have been built on the alignment of the Roman bridge, utilising its substantial masonry foundations as the basis for its timber superstructure. He has also shown that it would have been constructed and maintained by public obligations from estates within the surrounding area, and that ‘at least from the 790s, very probably from the 730s and possibly as far back as the days of Justus, Augustine and Aethelbert I of Kent, there was a system by which all lands in the kingdom were obliged to contribute men to build or repair bridges’ (Brooks 1994, 13–15; see also Brooks 1993). That London, like Rochester, became the seat of a bishop in AD 604, and that the crossing of the Thames at London would have had a similar strategic, geographical and practical importance as that at Rochester in the context of the development of the South of England at this time, suggests that it would be difficult to argue convincingly that London Bridge did not exist from this time.

The conclusion of these arguments and inferences is that there is likely to have been a continuity of use of the position of the bridge at London from the Roman period into, and throughout, the Saxon period until c.1000, with any post-Roman timber structure utilising the Roman stone-built starlings and foundations. It also seems likely that a bridge on these foundations would have been constructed (or reconstructed) to serve the needs of defence against Viking incursions as well as communication from at least the late 8th century under Offa, very probably from the early 8th century, and possibly from the early 7th century. This inference is not dependent on the issue of the existence or non-existence of a functioning bridge structure in the ‘dark ages’ from the 5th to the 7th centuries, about which little can be usefully said (Cowie 2008). The hypothesis of the use of the starlings and foundations of the Roman bridge in any subsequent construction is the most economical in terms of the logistics of the labour required to both reconstruct and maintain it, and provides the most realistic explanation of the survival of the alignment of the Roman roads approaching it on either side. It
also acknowledges the significance of the strategic need to provide for the defence of the Thames from at least the late 8th century, if not earlier, against incursions by shipborne Viking armies. Thereafter the vicissitudes of its survival in the hands of the elements and natural decay, not to mention fire and deliberate destruction, would have required more or less continuous maintenance, repair and replacement as required (as at Rochester) — especially since the bridge-builders in the 7th century would not have known how the river levels were to rise in the next few centuries. All these considerations strongly suggest, therefore, that the new Alfredian burh in London on the north bank of AD 879–80 would have inherited a more or less fully-functional bridge which, like the gates in the Roman walls, would have acted as a significant topographical determinant in the development not only of the street system and the settlement as a whole, but also the whole regime of the use of the waterfront areas both upstream and down-stream.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

An overall model is presented which attempts to characterise the physical and functional development of Alfred’s new burh of London within the walls of the former Roman town, which process arguably began in late AD 879 on the removal of the Viking forces occupying both London and Mercia. As the Chronicle makes clear, it was at this time that Guthrum and his army settled in an independent kingdom in East Anglia, and the army stationed at Fulham to the west of London returned to the Continent in search of more rewarding prospects for conquest. The creation of the burh within the Roman walls must, of course, be considered a process rather than a single event, requiring the extensive reorganisation and laying out of new streets, wharves, hithes, markets and probably churches. It would also have involved the repair and recommissioning of the walls and gates, including the Roman riverside wall, and the probable construction of new gates in the riverside wall to link the hithes on the foreshore to the emerging street system. It may well also have involved the creation of a new burh church at St Martin le Grand, as at Winchester and other places. It would have incorporated some physical and functional elements which had been established at earlier phases of the use of the intramural space as an organised community, which would have complemented those shown by the wic to its west. These elements may well have included a defended ‘burh’ surrounding St Paul’s cathedral, the possible use of the Roman amphitheatre, a functioning bridge which had probably been inherited from the Roman period, other high status sokes near St Paul’s and elsewhere, and possibly the rudiments of a central market street at Cheapside which was the focus of routeways from each of the Roman gates. Queenhithe appears to have functioned as a hith from sometime in the early or middle of the 9th century, which may well have marked the time when at least one of the streets to its north was first laid out. All of these various elements in the organisation of the new burghal space should be seen as being complementary in function in facilitating both permanent habitation and economic sustainability, as well as the establishment of a garrison as an effective means of the defence of the burh.

But there are nevertheless indications, partly from the minting of the London Monogram coins, as well as their suggested use (and loss) at Queenhithe, at this period, that the aspect of the interconnecting functionality of both the established and the new elements created at this time was part of an overall plan for the creation of a new urban place from its inception, which had novel social, commercial and religious aspects. This is reflected in the suggested reorganisation of the eastern part of the intramural space at this time, which is indicated by the creation of a large soke of the bishop of London, and by the creation of other sokes or wards, with associated churches, around the gates to facilitate both defence and settlement. It can be argued that these elements were designed to recreate the place as a new community in a way whereby its military effectiveness as a garrisoned fortress, which was to work in partnership with Alfred’s new standing army, was to be underpinned and guaranteed by its commercial, social and indeed religious viability and sustainability. In doing this, there are good grounds for believing that
King Alfred was merely continuing and extending a policy which he had already begun to put in place in the development of the system of burhs all over Wessex which are listed in the arguably contemporary Burghal Hidage. The coin evidence also gives grounds for suggesting that this policy of urban formation was extended to other places in southern Mercia, such as Gloucester, at the same time (Haslam forthcoming a). In such a way, the foundations for the subsequent development of London, many aspects of which can indeed be read from much later topographical and documentary survivals, came to be established on a basis which was to last in essentially its late Saxon form until the present day.  

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am particularly grateful to various people who have made valuable comments to various drafts of this paper, in particular Mark Blackburn, John Clark, Derek Keene, Pamela Taylor, Bruce Watson, Gareth Williams, Robin Wroe-Brown and Barbara Yorke, as well as an anonymous referee.

NOTES

1 These excavations await publication. I am grateful to Robin Wroe-Brown for his help in accessing material from the archives.
2 This point has been made by Alfred Smyth (Smyth 1995, 46). However, as argued above, his assumption that the Vikings were in control of London from AD 872 to 886 cannot be sustained. Tony Dyson has in this context suggested that the Vikings could well have had in mind the establishment of a second Jorvik in London (Dyson 1990, 101).
3 Tony Dyson has remarked of Botolph Wharf that it was ‘a public quay comparable in status, though not in size, with Billingsgate and Queenhithe’ (Dyson 1992b, 122).
4 For the rationale of this argument, based on recent work on town-plan analysis, see Baker & Slater 1992 and Lilley 2000, with references.
5 This conclusion has also been drawn by Martin Biddle (Biddle 1989, 29 n 98), though his view that this was laid out between AD 889 and 898 is itself predicated on Dyson’s views about the streets originating in the period between the two grants. For an instructive contrast of this plan unit with those of other burhs see Crummy 1979.
6 These streets are also recognised as primary by Tatton-Brown (Tatton-Brown 1986, 23), but he fails to draw the necessary conclusion that the line of these streets, the crossing of the Walbrook at the site of the Mansion House, and the extension westwards of these routes along Poultry / Cheapside on its present alignment must be contemporary. These arguments also run contrary to his thesis that the entrance to the burh from the approach road from the west along Holborn would not have been through Newgate but through Aldersgate.
7 Alan Vince has suggested that this is composed of stretches of different date (Vince 1990, 124–5), but this is contrary to its inferred functional unity in connecting the gate with Cheapside. It may well, however, as Vince has suggested, have shifted over time. Wood Street is discussed by Milne in an overall model for the development of the area, which is critically analysed further below (Milne 2001, 119–25).
8 See plan of the Cripplegate fort, showing Wood Street in relation to the Roman streets and the fort walls, in Grimes 1968, 28; Dyson & Schofield 1984, 306; Hobley 1988, 74; and Milne 2001, 123 fig 41.
9 See comments on the unsustainable hypotheses of Tim Tatton-Brown on the origin of these streets in note 6 above.
10 Milne’s model has had an influence on the interpretation of the early development of Wallingford (see Creighton et al 2009, 75 fig 7.5.) in a way which, in the writer’s view, obscures rather than illuminates this development (Haslam 2010).
11 Martin Biddle, however, makes the case that this would have been located within the area of the wic (Biddle 1989, 29). The connection with the trade in salt is discussed elsewhere (Haslam forthcoming a).
12 This identification of the 7th-century royal haga with the area of Lothbury seems, however, to be stretching evidence beyond its limits. Lothbury lies to the east of Walbrook in the walled area, and has no obvious associations with the probable royal enclave within or to the north of St Paul’s and is even further away from the area of the middle Saxon wic. A location of the haga of Hlothere within the early wic itself would seem more appropriate to its function.
13 Taylor has suggested that this grant was itself engineered through Ingeric’s royal connections (Taylor 2002, 228). See also Schofield et al 2007–8, 84–5.
14 Taylor quotes Matthew Paris as saying that Abbot Paul of St Albans (1077–93) exchanged St Alban Wood Street with Westminster ‘... for it had been the chapel of King Offa [our] founder, whose royal palace it continued to
be. But through neglect and inactivity the whole place became packed with inferior occupation of the neighbouring citizens, into small lodgings, but retained the ancient liberty’ (Taylor 2002, 220 & n 24). As Taylor also notes, the soke of Staeningahaga, located just to the north of St Martin’s, was given by Edward the Confessor to Westminster at the same time (Taylor 2002, 200 n 26), and so must have formed part of the earlier royal ‘liberty’ or precinct. The series of transactions involving Staeningahaga, the suggested refoundation of St Martin’s, the creation of the church of St Alban Wood Street and the involvement of St Albans Abbey in the 1060s can therefore be seen as being associated with, or resulting from, the changes in the royal interests in the area arising from the shift of Edward the Confessor’s interest to Westminster. While mentioning the views of Davis and Keene, who comment on the early relationship of St Martin’s to the putative royal palace, Taylor, however, appears to prefer the interpretation of Denton who argues that the Royal Free Chapel at St Martin’s was a new foundation on a new site (Denton 1970, 28, 40; Taylor 2002, 220–1). See further discussion on this topic by Tony Dyson and John Schofield (Dyson & Schofield 1984, 307–8).

A reconstruction of the foreshore shows an unstructured gap in the wall at the position of the hite (Vince 1990, 54, fig 19). In view of the importance of this wall in the arrangements for the defence of the burh by Alfred, it seems more likely that there would have been a gate at this point, as well as at others at the positions of the various hithes.

Similar conclusions are drawn from the evidence from the development of parishes in and around Oxford (Haslam forthcoming b).

Martin Biddle, however, sees this as being located within the wic (Biddle 1989, 29).

It is argued elsewhere that this charter was drawn up in the early 890s, and that the development of Worcester as a burh can be seen as a response to the renewed Viking raiding at the time (Haslam forthcoming a).

This is one of the most important indications of the early origins of the relationship between rural estates and urban tenements, which is such a feature of the description of towns in Domesday (Roffe 2007).

This justifies its original name of suthrigena-geweorc — ‘the Surreymen’s fortification’, later replaced by suth-geweorc, ‘the south fortification’ (Dodgson 1996, 120). Where the 600 hides due to Eashing came from is, however, a point of issue, which is addressed by Brooks (1996). It is probable that, as with the case of other shires, the original military hideage of the shire had been lessened in the two centuries before the assessments in Domesday Book both by beneficial hidation on some estates, and by the fact that there were many unhidated estates or parts of estates which were not included in the Domesday totals. It will be argued at a later date that the Calculation attached to version A of the Burghal Hidage, which gives the allocation of hides to specific lengths of defences, was written in the later 10th century to determine how the Alfredian system of burhs was to be brought into commission again after a period of neglect to meet the new Viking threats of the 990s. It has no relevance, therefore, to the determination of the lengths of defences of burhs built more than a century earlier.

21 See a statement of these arguments in <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burghal_Hidage>

22 The plan of the London and Southwark bridgeheads in c.1000 (given in Watson et al 2001, 34 fig 27) shows an outline of the suggested burh, based on the existence of an early 11th-century ditch at Hibernia Wharf. This is in the writer’s view an unlikely course of the defences of Ab 878–9 — it is unnecessarily small, it fails to utilise the defensive potential of the early creeks in the area, and it excludes the early minster of St Mary’s. This view of the course of the defences is premised on Watson’s view of the origin of the bridge and burh as belonging to the late 10th century, discussed below. A new interpretation of the layout of the burh at Southwark (though not apparently in its Alfredian phase, which is denied) is given by Watson (Watson 2009, 147 fig 1).

23 See note 20 above.

24 The burh at Southwark is one of the few listed in the Burghal Hidage whose existence cannot be demonstrated by physical evidence either above or below ground. Dyson’s conclusion is in part supported by his view that the name-form of the Burghal Hidage ‘might seem unduly artificial or abstract as the designation of a functioning fortress’ (Dyson 1990, 110 n 57). The contrary is in fact the case: the name must constitute the best internal evidence for the fact that the burhs were the responsibility of the men of the shire in which they were built, their hidages apportioned accordingly (Brooks 1996; Hinton 1996; Brooks 2003). Dyson’s views were developed in a paper written in about 1993 which was unfortunately not published, since he perceived that the archaeological community would have thought it too radical to appear in print (Dyson, pers comm). To the writer’s mind, this has been a loss to Burghal Hidage studies. Dyson’s thesis was that the scheme set out in the Burghal Hidage document was prescriptive rather than descriptive, and therefore preceded
the creation of the system it describes. This question has since been addressed by the present writer, who indeed sees the Burghal Hidage document as prescriptive, but that it was brought into being as an integral part of the process by which the system of burhs it describes were planned and built by Alfred and his advisors in AD 878–9, a rather earlier period than is envisaged by Dyson (Haslam 2005, 147–8; Haslam 2009, 111–14). Dyson’s views about the non-existence of a burh at Southwark, and therefore of an Alfredian bridge, have also been carried through to influence recent discussions on Southwark’s history (Brown 2008; Watson 2009).

For a discussion of the historical context of these, see Haslam forthcoming a and Haslam 2009, 108–9.

There are strong indications that a bridge at Wallingford would have led to territory on the other side of the Thames which was already in Alfred’s domain (Haslam 2005), and which would have formed part of Wallingford’s burghal territory (Roffe 2009, 40–5).

Carlín suggests the existence of a ‘fortified and garrisoned’ bridgehead from the time when in her view the bridge was first restored, ie the early 9th century (Carlín 1996, 12). In view of the lack of evidence for the construction of double burhs on the late 9th-century model, however, it would seem to be more realistic to posit the existence of a middle Saxon bridge without a fortification at Southwark, and that the bridgehead fortification or burh (first indicated by its inclusion in the Burghal Hidage) was a new innovation in the time of Alfred, in AD 878–9. There is, furthermore, no reason to argue that a bridge in this position would necessarily have impeded access by boat to the middle Saxon wiec upstream. There would have been no dangerous tidal races under the bridge, caused by the rise in sea levels in later centuries.

The use of burhs and bridges in Offa’s kingdom has been discussed (Haslam 1987a). For a more detailed discussion of burhs and bridges see Cooper 2006.

Aspects of the development of London in the 880s and 890s, including the interpretation of the reference in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle in AD 886, as well as the relationship of London to the development of the burghal system over southern Mercia, are discussed elsewhere (Haslam forthcoming a).

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